REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, SETTLEMENT,
AND RECONCILIATION:

SoKo B UKAI v. YWCA
Bill Ong Hing*
The day we served the lawsuit on them, we had a press conference and public
coverage. We had a performance by the Little Friends [preschoolers] who were
learning taiko. Later we learned the [SF YWCA] found it intimidating, [complaining] "they had their drumbeaters in tow," [but] the taiko drummers just became
a part of these public events. It has become a tradition-partof the community. It's
amazing because the combination of emotions-anger andfrustrationand the insult
and affront that has been put out by the [SF YWCA]-has coalesced into so much
community goodwill. This is one issue that has brought people into agreement who
normally don't see eye-to-eye about development in Japantown. This was partly
because of the nature of the [Little Friends]and the Bukai.
-Karen

Kai, Soko Bukai Legal Team Member, April 9, 2002.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Who was the rightful owner of the 1830 Sutter Street building in San
Francisco: the San Francisco Young Women's Christian Association (SF
YWCA) or the Japanese American community that had raised funds for its
purchase in the 1920s and approached the SF YWCA to hold the property in
trust for the community because Japanese immigrants were barred from owning
property? When the legal dispute over the ownership of a building in the heart
of San Francisco's Japantown ended with Japanese American community
groups agreeing to purchase the building for $733,000 from the SF YWCA in
February 2002, the result apparently provided vindication for a community victimized by alien land laws in the early 1900s and internment during World War
II. As Reverend Lloyd Wake, a member of the plaintiff group, put it, "We can
now say that this building belongs to the community ....
We rededicate it and
pray that it may continue to serve the community."' John Tateishi, executive
director of the Japanese American Citizens League, noted, "This is a great resoProfessor of Law and Asian American Studies, University of California, Davis. Many
thanks to Soko Bukai attorneys, Karen Kai, Robert Rusky, Donald Tamaki, and Tracie
Brown for their cooperation and advice, and to the Japanese immigrant women of the 1920s
for their inspiration. I received excellent research assistance from Lindsay Bennett,
Christine Ichimura, Trang Doan, and Melyssa Minamoto. I also appreciate the hospitality of
the symposium organizers, especially Lynne Henderson.
' Avy Mallik, Japantown YWCA Victory Celebratedwith Rededication, ASIANWEEK, Aug.
2 - Aug. 8, 2002, available at http://www.asianweek.com/2002-08_02/bay-ywca.html.
*
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It's so symbolic that a building of such significance from our
lution ....
history and our past is becoming the edifice for our future."'
The lawsuit and its settlement provide a unique opportunity to consider
theories of dispute settlement in the context of community lawyering where
many of the attorneys themselves are from the community. From the perspective of the Japanese American community, a number of questions are raised in
this case: Was settlement the desired outcome in a case of such high social
significance, or should the case have gone to trial and perhaps to a higher court
for a definitive adjudication? In other words, should the community lawyers
have pushed on to trial to seek a return of the property to the community at no
cost? Did the settlement and mediation process provide enough room or opportunity for the community lawyers to educate younger members of the community about the history of the alien land laws and internment, and was that one of
the purposes of the suit? What effect did community activism and participation
have in the outcome of the case, and was that part of the strategy? How did the
community lawyers work with the community, explain what was going on,
demonstrate respect for the community, and what rebellious qualities did they
use if any? Was one of the overall goals in the process to realize a sense of
reconciliation for the community, and, if so, reconciliation with whom? Was
maintaining a good relationship with the SF YWCA an important goal in the
dispute?
II.

BACKGROUND ON ALIEN LAND LAWS

After the exclusion of Chinese laborers from the. United States was codified in 1882, farmers and plantation owners in Hawaii and the West Coast
looked to Japan as a source of cheap, reliable farm workers. In the 1890s,
27,000 Japanese immigrated to work in Hawaii and the West Coast. Recruitment was then stepped up between 1901 and 1910, with 130,000 Japanese
laborers entering the United States.3 However, just as animosity toward Chinese laborers had grown over job competition and race, resentment toward Japanese immigrants simmered and then boiled over as well. Calls for Japanese
exclusion intensified by the late 1800s, but after the 1905 Japanese defeat of
Russia in war, President Theodore Roosevelt determined that an outright legislated exclusion of Japanese laborers was not the wise course. Instead,
Roosevelt dispatched representatives to Japan to negotiate an agreement, and
an accord was reached in 1908. Under the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement,"
Japan agreed to limit the number of laborers that could leave Japan to come to
the United States. In exchange, Japanese nationals already in the United States
could petition for their spouses and children to join them in the United States.4
The benefit of family unification was obvious; in spite of suffering resentment
at the hands of some, Japanese immigrants in America could enjoy a family
2 Deborah Kong, Land Ownership Dispute Rooted in Now-Repealed Racist Laws, SACRA-

MENTO GAZETrE, Mar. 8, 2002, at 7.
1 Bill Ong Hing, MAKING AND REMAKING AsiAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY,

1850-1990 53 (1993).
4 Id. at 29. As part of the agreement, San Francisco public school authorities agreed to
rescind an order that had segregated Japanese students. Id.
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life. However, one unanticipated consequence of family life was that the number of Japanese Americans would grow naturally through the birth of new
children.
Japanese American family life in the United States afforded some families
the opportunity to settle in certain parts of the West where prospects to
purchase farmland were presented. Many Japanese immigrants and their families were successful at this. In fact, by 1913 when California's first alien land
law was enacted, 4,000 Japanese in the state operated farms, and another
20,000 were farm workers. 5 Furthermore, while Japanese immigrants controlled only one percent of the farmland, their farms produced ten percent of
California's produce. 6 Many white farmers resented the competition and urged
state legislators to figure out a way to stop the situation from expanding.
In 1913, California enacted the nation's first alien land law that limited
land ownership to aliens "eligible to citizenship." 7 Anyone who broke the law
was subject to criminal penalties and their property would be forfeited to the
state. 8 The craftiness of the "ineligible to citizenship" bar was that it eliminated the need to specifically designate a racial or ethnic group for exclusion.
Under a post-Civil War 1870 revision to the citizenship laws, only whites and
immigrants of African descent were eligible for citizenship through naturalization. Chinese immigrants had been specifically excluded, 9 and courts generally
agreed that all immigrants of Asian descent were barred. A challenge to the
naturalization bar to Japanese immigrants was pursued by Takao Ozawa before
the United States Supreme Court in 1923, but the Court made it clear that Japanese immigrants were not intended to benefit from the post-civil war naturalization laws which were restricted to "free white persons" and those of "African
descent": 10
The determination that the words "white person" are synonymous with the words "a
person of the Caucasian race" simplifies the problem, although it does not entirely
dispose of it. Controversies have arisen and will no doubt arise again in respect of
the proper classification of individuals in border line cases. The effect of the conclusion that the words "white person" mean a Caucasian is not to establish a sharp line
of demarcation between those who are entitled and those who are not entitled to
naturalization, but rather a zone of more or less debatable ground outside of which,
upon the one hand, are those clearly eligible, and outside of which, upon the other
hand, are those clearly ineligible for citizenship. Individual cases falling within this
zone must be determined as they arise from time to time by what this Court has
called, in another connection (citation omitted) "the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion."
The appellant, in the case now under consideration, however, is clearly of a race
which is not Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone on the negative side. A large number of the federal and state courts have so decided and we find
no reported case definitely to the contrary. These decisions are sustained by numer5 Id. at 56.

Id. at 30.
See generally Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land
Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REv. 37 (1998).
8 HING, supra note 3, at 30; Petitioner Soko Bukai's Status Conference Statement, Nov. 27,
2001, at 2, 3 [hereinafter "Petitioner's Statement"].
9 In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223 (C.C. Cal. 1878) (No. 104).
10 Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
6

7
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ous scientific authorities, which we do not deem it necessary to review. We think
these decisions are right and so hold. 11
A year later, the undesirability of Japanese immigrants was underscored
when Congress enacted the national origins quota system to govern immigration policies. While the law's major targets were southern and eastern Europeans, a provision was added to exclude all aliens who were "ineligible to
citizenship."1 " Nothing more needed to be stated. With that one phrase, Congress had enacted a blatant Japanese exclusion law.
The message of the 1913 California alien land law had been loud and clear
as well: control of property by Japanese immigrants would not be tolerated.
While the law went through different iterations over the years - mostly to close
loopholes, 13 the ban remained in force until 1952 when the California Supreme
Court ruled the law unconstitutional. 14
III.

ESTABLISHING THE JAPANTOWN

YWCA

In the early 1900s, the main facilities of the SF YWCA were not available
to "Chinese, Japanese, or colored girls."'" So in 1912, a group of Japanese
Christian women from the Soko Bukai churches decided to form their own
"Japanese YWCA."'

6

Soko Bukai was and continues to be an association of

Japanese Christian churches in San Francisco. 7 Initially the group rented
space for its services, but by 1920, the women realized that they needed something larger and more permanent.18 The women wanted to purchase larger
space, but because they believed that California's alien land law barred them
from owning property, they approached the SF YWCA for assistance in creating a trust to own the property in order to get around the laws.19 Although the
organization maintained a segregationist policy at the time toward "Chinese,
Japanese or other colored girls [with respect to its main] Boarding Home," the
SF YWCA had established separate "International Institutes" to provide
English classes and recreation for other immigrant women.20
According to the diary of Yonako Abiko, one of the founders of the
Japantown YWCA, on May 25, 1920, she and two board members of the SF
YWCA (Mrs. Boardman and Miss Ellis) met with Guy Calden "about the legal
matter regarding the purchase of Y.W.C.A. building. '2 1 Calden was a prominent San Francisco attorney who was well versed in helping immigrants cir11 Id. at 198.
12 HING, supra note 3, at 32.
13 In the 1920s, even the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the discriminatory impact of alien
land laws did not violate equal protection guarantees of the constitution. Webb v. O'Brien,
263 U.S. 313 (1923).
14 See Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718 (1952); see also Masaoka v. People, 39 Cal. 2d 883
(1952).
15 Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 2.
16 Id.
17 Id. at n.1.
18 Id. at 2.
19 Bernice Yeung, A Matter of Trusts, SF WEEKLY, July 11, 2001, at ??.
20 Man J. Matsuda, Race, Memory, and Civil Society: The Japanese YWCA Case, at 12-13
(2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
21 Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 6.
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cumvent the alien land laws, primarily through trust agreements.2 2 Three days
later, on May 28, 1920, the SF YWCA board minutes noted a proposal that:
[T]he Japanese people rai[se] funds to purchase a house to be used for the Japanese
Y.W.C.A. This property23 to be bought by the local Association and held in trust for
the Japanese Y.W.C.A.
A week later, the YWCA board decided 4"to take no further action until the
2

Japanese people had more money in hand."
Accordingly, the Japanese community set about to raise funds. Several
months later, on February 4, 1921, as the community eyed a particular piece of
property on Pine Street, the SF YWCA board minutes noted:
The Japanese people have $2,000 pledged, and they wished to authorize the Board of
Trustees to offer not more tha[n] $6,500 for the property and to hold it in trustfor the
exclusive use of the Japanese Y. W. C.A. Moved by Mrs. Hamilton [and] seconded by
Mrs. Boardman that the Board of Trustees be authorized to investigate the house and
lot.., with a view to the purchase of it for the permanent use of the Japanese branch
of the San Francisco Y.W.C.A ....
Unanimously carried, 25
The Pine Street property was not purchased, but in June a different prop-

erty surfaced as a possibility - 1830 Sutter Street, and a new motion was made
and adopted by the SF YWCA board:
[T]he same recommendation that was made in regard to purchase of the property on
Pine Street be made to apply to the purchase of the property on Sutter Street for this
Association to carry on its Japanese work.2 6
On July 7, 1921, Abiko and Boardman again met with attorney Calden and
"discussed the 'detail' of the [Japanese YWCA] building purchase." 27 Abiko
"reported on the purchase of a society building" that afternoon to the Japanese
YWCA group. 28 A day later, the SF YWCA board met:
Mrs. Boardman reported on the purchase of the house on Sutter Street for the permanent use of the Japanese Branch of the Japanese San Francisco Y.W.C.A. and asked
that the following recommendations be adopted: "It is recommended that the sum of
22 An 80-year-old Diary Helps End a Legal Dispute, THE RECORDER, June 24, 2002, at 4;
Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 6. Calden represented Japanese Americans in cases
involving property ownership and the alien land laws in a number of reported cases. See,
e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Masaoka v. People, 39 Cal. 2d 883 (1952);
Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, 32 Cal. 2d 53 (1948); People v. Fujita, 215 Cal. 166 (1932);
In re Estate and Guardianship of Tetsubumi Yano, 188 Cal. 645 (1922). He is also credited
with helping Japanese American farmers establish the Cortez Growers Association in
Merced County, California in 1924. Calden had a reputation as:
[A]n expert on land laws who had created a partial road map to the American dream. [He] knew
the ins and outs of corporation law .... Calden used a legal loophole to create dummy corporations that could own land. He named the immigrants' American-bom children as corporation
officers. The corporations were given American-sounding names such as Sunny Acre Farms Co.
and T&M Vineyards, instead of names like Yotsuya Acres or Miyamoto Farms.
Patrick Giblin, Cortez Growers Co-op that helped Japanese Americans chase their Dreams
Celebrates 75 Years, MODESTO BEE, Mar. 21, 1999, at Al.
23 Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 3 (citing SF YWCA Board Minutes, May 28,
1920, 1).
24 Id. at 3-4 (citing SF YWCA Board Minutes, June 4, 1920).
25 Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 4.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 6-7.
28 Id.at 7.
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$1,000.00 which has been withdrawn from the Federal Reserve Fund of the International Institute and be borrowed from that fund by the general fund of this Association .... It is recommended that the repayment of this by the Japanese Centre [sic]
in installments of forty dollars ($40.00) a month be accepted. It is recommended that
the attached resolutions be spread upon the minutes of this board since they have
been accepted by our lawyer.
Moved by Mrs. Boardman seconded by Mrs. Van Winkle that this be done -carried.

Mrs. Boardman also read the following resolution with the request that it
be adopted:
If this property is sold or any income derived from it other than Japanese Y.W.C.A.
uses, the funds shall be applied to Christian work for Japanese women and girls in
San Francisco after consultation with the Japanese Y.W.C.A. or their successors. No
decision is to be made about the uses of this property without consultation with the
Japanese Y.W.C.A. Board.
Moved by Mrs. Boardman seconded by Mrs. Davis that the provisions of this resolution be carried out. Unanimously carried. 2 9

Thus, the 1830 Sutter building was purchased by the SF YWCA and was
immediately used as the Japanese YWCA. The initial funding appears to
include a $250 deposit by the SF YWCA toward the $6,500 purchase price and
eventually a down payment of $3,000 with a $3500 mortgage.3 0 The $3000
initial payment consisted of a $2000 pledge from the Japanese American comInternational Institute;
munity and a $1000 loan from the Reserve Fund of the
3
the loan was to be repaid in $40 monthly payments. 1
The mortgage was paid from "Community Chest" funds that were made
available to local charities in San Francisco. 32 In 1922, the Community Chest
system was instituted to help fund local charities. Organizations like the
YWCA would fund raise for the Community Chest pool and, in turn, the Community Chest would redistribute funds to the organizations based on budget
requests.3 3 Records indicated that mortgage payments for the 1830 Sutter
building were channeled to the YWCA from the Community Chest for that
purpose. 34 Significantly, several elderly Japanese Americans who were
deposed during the Soko Bukai litigation recall helping their parents and community groups with a variety of fundraising efforts during this period, including
bake sales, door-to-door canvassing, movie ticket sales, and dinner parties.35
The funds were then collected by the parents and turned over to the SF
YWCA. 36 The 1830 Sutter building was put to community use for quite some
time, but the parties did not live happily ever after.
Id. at 4-5.
Respondent's Status Conference Statement, Nov. 27, 2001, 5 [hereinafter "Respondent's
Statement"].
31 Id.
32 Id. at 5-6.
33 Id. at 5.
34 Id. at 5-6.
31 See, e.g., Deposition of Tomoye Takahashi, Aug. 30, 2001, 17-28; Deposition of Uta
Hirota, Aug. 21, 2001, 33-58.
36 Id.

29

30
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HISTORY OF THE BUILDING

Records from the 1930s reveal the intent to treat the property as being held
in trust for the benefit of the Japanese American community. In 1932, the
Japanese YWCA published a twenty year retrospective that stated: "'[I]n January of 1931, we completed the payments for the full amount of the purchase' of
the property, which the SF YWCA had financed through a ...bank . . . 'this
building of ours belongs not only to us but also to the Japanese community in
general.' ,37 Three years later when the International Institute decided to sepa-

rate from the SF YWCA, the Japanese YWCA decided to remain part of the SF
YWCA. 38 The SF YWCA board agreed that the Japanese YWCA would continue with the same structure and arrangements relating to the 1830 Sutter
Street property:
That the building continue to be used for purposes of the Japanese YWCA and if at
some future time, any change in the use of the building should be considered, such

and its approval be
change would be submitted to the Japanese Board of Directors 39
secured before the change should be considered to be in effect.
Due to deteriorating conditions in 1929,40 however, a decision was made
to raze the building and a new structure was constructed in 1932. The proposal
to erect a new building was put forward by the Japanese YWCA and was
approved by the SF YWCA with the understanding that the Japanese American
community would raise funds for the project.4" Famed architect Julia Morgan
donated her services and the construction costs totaled about $24,000.42 The
parties in Soko Bukai v. SF YWCA, however, differ as to how much the Japanese American community contributed to the construction costs. The SF
4
YWCA claims that the community contributions amounted to about $3,000, 1
but the Japanese American community claims that its contribution includes the

funds that were raised by the community and placed into the hands of the Community Chest system, which totaled $22,650.4
The new building was warmly received by the community's residents as
their "permanent club house," dedicated to Japanese YWCA services for the

Japanese American community. 4 ' Architect Morgan used Japanese architectural design and helped the community locate and furnish its interior with Asian
art pieces and artifacts. 46 The building served as the Japanese YWCA until the
1942 internment of West Coast Japanese Americans. 47
37 Petitioner's
38 Id.
39 Id. at 6.
40

Statement, supra note 8, at 5.

Interview with Peter Hart, attorney for SF YWCA (Apr. 11, 2002).

Petition to Enforce Charitable Trust and to Remove Trustee and Appoint Successor Trustee, Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, No. 269330, Sept. 30,
41

1997, 6 [hereinafter "Petition to Enforce"].
42

Id. at 7.

43 Respondent's Statement, supra note 30, at 6.
44 Petition to Enforce, supra note 41, at 6-7.
45 Id. at 7.
46 id.
47 Id.
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Obviously, since the directors were interned along with 120,000 other Japanese Americans, the Japanese YWCA could not function during the war.4 8
Nonetheless, the building was maintained for community purposes. Beginning
in 1942, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) leased the building,
providing services to internees during and after the war, while maintaining a
public stance in opposition to internment.49 The AFSC helped returning Japanese American women and girls and their families who were looking for shelter, employment, and schooling. 5 °
After Japanese Americans were released from the internment camps in
1946, the Japanese YWCA did not resume its activities. The SF YWCA portrays this failure as a lack of "desire and the resources" on the part of the
community.5 1 Soko Bukai points out, however, that many internees did not
return to San Francisco, 52 and those who did faced a different San Francisco.
Many African Americans had moved to the Western Addition during the war,
as did Europeans fleeing the devastation of war.5 3 The former internees were
essentially told by the SF YWCA that an integration policy had been instituted
and the Japanese YWCA could no longer function because single-race programs were no longer permitted.5 4 The returnees were told that their old program was part of a larger Western Addition group. Not surprisingly, the
returning women simply accepted these instructions; after all, the post-internment period was not a time to fight for a community that had just been released
from custodial settings.55 The idea was that the YWCA would run a joint
neighborhood program with the YMCA in the YMCA's building several blocks
away.5 6 (The joint YMCA/YWCA program ceased in 1960." 7) In spite of that
agreement, the 1830 Sutter building was used as a residential facility for Japanese women and girls returning from the camps. Moreover, while the AFSC
was a tenant (through 1960), many Japanese American community programs
and services were maintained in the building.58
The property experienced other changes in the 1960s. In 1961, the SF
YWCA purchased the adjacent lot (1834 Sutter), razed the building and developed a playground area and a small parking lot.5 9 The City had considered the
building at 1834 Sutter a nuisance, so its purchase and demolition actually
enhanced the value of the 1830 Sutter property. 60 A preschool childcare program was implemented in the building in the mid-1960s.61 In 1966, the board
48 Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 7.
49

Id. at 8.

50 Petition to Enforce, supra note 41, at 9.

51 Respondent's Statement, supra note 30, at 8. The SF YWCA found one witness, Fred
Hoshiyama, who said the community had no interest in reconstituting the Japanese YWCA.
Interview of Peter Hart, supra note 40.
52 Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 7-8.
53 Petition to Enforce, supra note 41, at 9.
54 Interview with Karen Kai, attorney and Little Friends board member (Apr. 9, 2002).
55 Id.
56 Petition to Enforce, supra note 41, at 9.
51 Respondent's Statement, supra note 30, at 8.
58 Petition to Enforce, supra note 41, at 9.
59 Respondent's Statement, supra note 30, at 8.
60 Petition to Enforce, supra note 41, at 10.
61 Interview of Karen Kai, supra note 54.
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and in 1969 the
voted to cease sponsoring any groups with racial restrictions,
62
center was renamed the "Western Addition Center."
The property continued to serve community functions. In 1971, the SF
YWCA contemplated selling 1830 Sutter, 63 but changed its mind after African
American and Japanese American residents protested.6 4 Instead, renovations
were made to the property in 1973, and the San Francisco Redevelopment
Agency deeded an 18-inch-wide parcel adjacent to 1830 Sutter to the SF
YWCA in 1976.65 Since 1972, the basement of the building had been leased to
the Harrison Out-of-School Program, a non-YWCA program run by Dorothy
Harrison which provided services to adolescent African American girls in the
Western Addition. 66 In the 1970s, the building also housed Christ United Presbyterian Church, one of the member churches of the Soko Bukai. 67 And beginning in 1985, the building's large theater space was leased to the Nihonmachi
Little Friends Preschool Program, serving Japanese American and Western
Addition communities.68 Little Friends, an important provider of child care
and preschool programs since 1972, made improvements to the children's playground after moving in.69
V.

LITIGATION MOTIONS AND DISCOVERY

Faced with serious financial difficulties in 1996, the SF YWCA attempted
to sell the Japanese YWCA for $1.65 million and evict the long time nonprofit
tenants that were providing services in the area. 70 The Japantown community
felt shocked and betrayed by the SF YWCA, believing that its actions in the
early 1920s amounted to a legally enforceable trust and that the SF YWCA
violated the agreement by placing the property up for sale. 7 1 The Japanese
American community, however, wanted to resolve the dispute amicably.7 2
Before taking legal action, community leaders attempted to meet with SF
YWCA representatives, and community groups offered to purchase the property for $1.2 million. The SF YWCA, however, did not respond.73 When
efforts to resolve the matter informally failed, Soko Bukai brought an action in
62

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, at, 4.

63

Id.

64 Respondent's Statement, supra note 30, at 8-9.
65
66

Id.

Petition to Enforce, supra note 41, at 10-11; Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky (Apr.

9, 2002).
67
68

Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 8.
Id.

69 Petition to Enforce at 10.
70

Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 1; Annie Nakao, Fight Over HistoricJapantown

YWCA Ends in Settlement, SF CHRONICLE, Feb. 27, 2002, at A15.
71 Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 1.
72 Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
73 Memorandum from Robert Rusky, Oct. 17, 2004 (on file with author). The offer was
made by the Japanese Cultural and Community Center of Northern California in September
1996. Later, in February 2000, Nihonmachi Little Friends offered $300,000. Leaders felt this
was a reasonable offer since the Chinese YWCA had been sold to the Chinese American
community for in 1996 for $800,000, and the Chinese YWCA was much larger, more ornate,
and in much better condition. Id. See also Interview of Donald Tamaki, Apr. 15, 2002 (on

file with author).
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San Francisco Superior Court on September 30, 1997, seeking the enforcement
of the charitable trust and the removal of the SF YWCA as the trustee. Soko
Bukai, the petitioner in this action, is a California non-profit corporation centered in San Francisco, California.75 The Japanese term "Soko Bukai" means
"San Francisco Church Organizations" and is also formally referred to as the
San Francisco District for the Northern California Japanese Christian Churches
Federation. 76 For almost a century, Soko Bukai has supported and coordinated
social and-religious activities in the San Francisco Japanese American community.7 7 Three principal churches make up the Soko Bukai: Pine United Methodist Church, Christ United Presbyterian Church, and Christ Episcopal
Church. 78

The SF YWCA immediately filed a demurrer to the petition challenging
Soko Bukai's standing, but on January 13, 1998, a superior court judge overruled the demurrer. Six months later, the same judge denied the SF YWCA's
motion to sever the issues and bifurcate the trial. Undaunted, the SF YWCA
filed a motion for summary judgment, attacking the existence of a trust with a
host of theories, but on November 30, 1998, that motion was also denied. In
the court's view, the SF YWCA's own historical board7 9 minutes presented triable issues of fact regarding the existence of the trust.
While the various motions were being filed, briefed, and argued in 1998,
the parties conducted extensive discovery, inspecting thousands of documents
and answering numerous interrogatories. Attempts at mediation were then
instituted, but these efforts terminated unsuccessfully in April 2001. Intensive
fact discovery followed. While Soko Bukai took eleven depositions, the SF
YWCA took forty. Further document requests, interrogatories, and requests for
admissions ensued. In total, Soko Bukai had to respond to over 215 special
interrogatories. 8'
The SF YWCA also filed some unusual motions. In November 1999, the
SF YWCA successfully moved to disqualify Soko Bukai's initial trial counsel,
McCutchen, Doyle, Brown and Enerson, from continuing its representation.
Apparently the firm had represented the YWCA in previous matters and may
have obtained confidential information relevant to this lawsuit.8" A new firm,
Cooley Godward, substituted in as trial counsel in February 2000.82
The SF YWCA, however, was not finished with its disqualification tactics.
In July 2001, the SF YWCA moved to disqualify one Cooley attorney, two
other Soko Bukai attorneys and one attorney for the Little Friends preschool.
Even though that motion was denied,83 the SF YWCA attorneys appealed these
71 See generally Petition to Enforce, supra note 41.
71 Id.at 3.
76

Id.

77 Id.
78

Id.

71 Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 9.
80 Id.at 10.
81 Id. at 10.
82 Id.

83 Id. The respondent accused Karen Kai, Bob Rusky, Tracie Brown, and Mar Mayeda of

ex parte contacts with "a represented counsel and other ethical violations." Respondent's
Statement, supra note 30, at 10.
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issues to the Court of Appeals and then the California Supreme Court. The SF
YWCA, however, lost in those forums as well.84 The SF YWCA's omnibus
motion to compel further discovery was also denied on October 3, 2001.85
Apparently, the SF YWCA wanted to subpoena from the Japanese American
History Archives a translation of the Japanese-language book, Zai Bei Nihonjin
Shi.86 The SF YWCA made two additional motions: a motion to continue the
initial November 5 trial date and a motion to join as involuntary plaintiffs the
three Soko Bukai churches, the Little Friends preschool, as well as six other
Japanese American community groups. 87

The SF YWCA's continuance request was based on the fact that in July
2001, it learned of the existence and content of Japanese-language diaries kept
by one of the founders of the Japanese YWCA that spanned the period from the
founding of the Japanese YWCA in 1912 through her death in 1944. The
"Abiko Diaries" were scribed in an "individualistic, cursive style," characteristic of the Japanese style of the early part of the twentieth century." 88 Photocopies were allegedly difficult to read and the original was in the Special
Collections Department of the University of California at Los Angeles Library.
In September 1998, Soko Bukai representatives became aware of the existence
of these diaries and requested that its expert, a visiting Fulbright scholar at
UCLA, review the Abiko Diaries in preparation for testifying about them at
trial. This expert began her translations in the autumn of 1998 and produced
written translations of selected sections in August of 1999.89
The SF YWCA was disturbed that Soko Bukai did not mention the Abiko
Diaries in response to any interrogatories or other discovery requests. The SF
YWCA stated that it had become aware of the diaries by "pure chance." 90
Only then, according to the SF YWCA, did Soko Bukai reveal its intent to use
excerpts to prove its case-in-chief. So on September 14, 2001, the SF YWCA
requested a one-year continuance to translate the diaries; Soko Bukai suggested
three months. 9 '

In sum, the parties were engaged in an intense litigation battle. Whether
an actual enforceable charitable trust was established by the actions taken by
the parties in the early 1920s may not have been an easy question to answer for
the Superior Court. The actions of the parties in seeking counsel from Guy
Calden, an expert in helping Japanese immigrants circumvent the alien land
84 Interview of Donald Tamaki, supra note 73.
85 Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 10.
86 Respondent's Statement, supra note 30, at 11.

Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 10. Respondent felt that the three constituent
churches of the Soko Bukai (Pine United Methodist Church, Christ United Presbyterian
Church and Christ Episcopal Church) should be jined, along with other "indispensable parties": Nihonmachi Little Friends, The Northern California Japanese Church Federation or
"Domei," the Japanese Cultural and Community Center of Northern California, Kimochi,
Inc., the Japanese American Citizen's League, the Japanese American Democratic Club, and
the Japanese Community Youth Council. Respondent's Statement, supra note 30, at 12.
88 Respondent's Statement, supra note 30, at 11; see generally Donald Tamaki, Soko Bukai
87

v. the San Francisco YWCA, 28 AMERASIA J. xxv (2002).

89 Respondent's Statement, supra note 30, at 11.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 11-12.
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laws,9" and the language found in the SF YWCA board minutes (e.g., "to hold
in trust for the exclusive use of the Japanese Y.W.C.A.") certainly lend
credence to Soko Bukai's claim. The petitioner's legal representatives alleged
that the basic elements of a trust were present: intent, property, purpose, and a
beneficiary. 93 On the other hand, the SF YWCA's attorneys argued that Soko
Bukai lacked standing to bring the action because the beneficiary of the alleged
trust was the "San Francisco YWCA," an organization that no longer existed.94
They further asserted that the action was barred by the statute of limitations or
the equitable doctrine of laches; after all, the alien land law was declared
unconstitutional in 1952, Japanese-only programs were barred from the building in 1966, and the "building was renamed, removing the reference to 'Japanese"' in 1969. 9"
VI.

COMMUNITY LAWYERING

Almost twenty years ago, in her study of how attorneys do their work in a
variety of settings, Eve Spangler's findings with respect to Legal Services attorneys who represent indigent and low-income clients was troubling: "Business
lawyers are the least inclined to voice egalitarian politics, yet they are highly
respectful of their clients' wishes and in general they also admire their clients.
By contrast, Legal Services attorneys are known for their left-of-center politics.
Yet they have substantially less egalitarian relationships with their own clients
than do the business lawyers."'9 6 A typical statement from "overworked" Legal
Services attorneys might be, "[We] preach client autonomy, but in reality, it's a
little impractical when the client isn't educated or doesn't know the system so
she can make choices.

97

The attorneys who represented Soko Bukai handled the case pro bono.
However, it would be a real mistake to think of them in the same vein as the
Legal Services attorneys that were studied by Spangler in the 1980s. They
were community lawyers who might share a "left of center politics" with Legal
Services attorneys, but they certainly did not call the shots in the course of the
litigation, and they were greatly respectful of the wishes of their clients.
Karen Kai, Donald Tamaki, and Robert Rusky, three of the key members
of the Soko Bukai legal team, were well known in the Japanese American community because they had been part of the group that successfully represented
Fred Korematsu in his coram nobis action in the 1980s, convincing the federal
district court to set aside Korematsu's World War II era conviction for violating internment evacuation orders.98 They were well versed in coalition work
and widely respected in the broader civil rights community. 99 As experienced
rebellious community lawyers, they had a wide base of community contacts
92 See supra note 22.
93 Petitioner's Statement, supra note 8, at 11.
94 Respondent's Draft Motion for Summary Judgment at 7-11.
95 Id. at 14-15.
96 EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK

97 Id. at 167.

9' Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Ca. 1984).
99 Matsuda, supra note 20, at 28-29.

170 (1986).
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and allies, media savvy, and government contacts that contributed to their
effectiveness as top notch civil rights attorneys.i °°
Kai, Tamaki, and Rusky were also very much a part of the affected community. Of course, working on the Korematsu case was enough to make them
part of the community, but Kai and her husband, Rusky, were active with
Nihonmachi Little Friends where they had sent their son as a preschooler. Kai
was also on the board of directors of Little Friends."0 Kai grew up in the
Japanese American community in San Jose, California, and went to school at
San Francisco State University."0 2 She and Rusky attended law school at the
University of San Francisco." 3 As Kai learned more about the history of the
1830 Sutter Street building, she realized what a unique legacy it represented - a
legacy that would have been destroyed by the sale or destruction of the building. That loss, especially in light of all the other losses the community had
As for Tamaki, like many other
sustained in the past, was "unthinkable."
Japanese Americans at the time, Tamaki's father had circumvented the alien
land laws by placing title to a Japantown hotel in the name of his citizen children as trustees; the last mortgage payment was made three days before Pearl
Harbor.' 0 5
Tracie Brown, who was an associate at Cooley Godward, also worked on
behalf of Soko Bukai pro bono. Although she was not from the community,
her mother was an immigrant from Japan. Brown felt a "connection" with the
Issei women who founded the Japanese YWCA and clearly was moved by the
"inspirational community base and showing of support."' 10 6 Because of the
strong community involvement, however, Brown felt "pressure to live up to the
'10 7
The pres[community's] expectations and "not to let [the people] down."
sure was born of passion for the community:
I did have to occasionally stop from thinking "oh my god, if we lose this, I am going
to kill myself' because I will be so embarrassed to have let down so many people,
gracious 90-year-olds who were so charming
including these wonderful, wonderful,
0 8
and giving everything they could.'

Being teamed with the likes of Tamaki, Kai, and Rusky, an attorney like
Brown who was new to the community could not help but be exposed to a
rebellious style of lawyering that was deeply respectful of and collaborative
with the community: "It really opened my eyes to a totally different type of
litigation that was unbelievably rewarding. I've met a bunch of people in this
community who are really incredibly strong people and very committed to the
work that they do and that was wonderful to see." 10 9
In Gerald L6pez's seminal work on collaborative, rebellious, community
lawyering, he explains:
100 id. at 29.
101

Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
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Interview of Karen Kai, supra note 54.
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Id.

104 Id.
105 Interview of Tracie Brown, Soko Bukai attorney (Apr. 18, 2002).
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In this idea - what I call the rebellious idea of lawyering against subordination lawyers must know how to work with (not just on behalf of) women, low-income
people, people of color, gays and lesbians, the disabled, and the elderly. They must
know how to collaborate with other professional and lay allies rather than ignoring
the help that these other problem-solvers may provide in a given situation. They
must understand how to educate those with whom they work, particularly about law
and professional lawyering, and, at the same time, they must open themselves up to
about the
being educated by all those with whom they come into contact, particularly
1 10
traditions and experiences of life on the bottom and at the margins.

A key element of Lopez's vision is that the subordinated groups usually
have expert knowledge of forces of repression and have developed skills for
handling them. Survival requires that subordinated groups develop such understanding and the ability to anticipate the wishes and reactions of those forces.
L6pez urges lawyers to respect and tap such knowledge and skills and to
endeavor to develop their own analogous "feel" for how things work in communities and institutions. Rebellious lawyers can do so primarily by honing
their listening skills and powers of observation."' One need only think of the
survival skills that racially-excluded and interned Japanese Americans had to
develop in order to understand their problem-solving talents in the context of
L6pez's vision.
L6pez does not argue that subordinated people's knowledge and stories
are better than those of lawyers. In his vision, both groups are essential to the
struggle "to fundamentally transform the world." To make such change, L6pez
explains, subordinated groups and their attorneys "do not want simply to add to
each other's knowledge, a bit of this and a bit of that coexisting easily. Instead,
they desire to challenge what each knows - how each gained it, what each
believes about it, how each shares and uses it.""' 2 Rather than emphasizing
their fragility or placing lower-income people on a pedestal, L6pez urges lawyers to engage their clients as true equals, worthy of respect but also of caring
confrontation. He calls for a collaboration of "co-eminent" practitioners, by
whom he means lawyers, clients, and other potential problem-solvers such as
community activists, organizers, media, administrators, policy makers,
researchers, and funders." 13 The existence and relevance of these other lay
problem-solvers is a core element of L6pez's vision. In his view, careful investigation of subordinated communities reveals many individuals, groups, and
organizations working to challenge subordination. In L6pez's vision, lawyers
must be skilled legal technicians and engaged public citizens and activists.
They must expertly navigate and integrate many worlds: the legal, interpersonal, social, and political.
Given the community origins of the Soko Bukai legal team, it is easy to
see the basis for the extraordinary collaboration that took place between the
team and the community in L6pezian fashion. The Soko Bukai legal team's
respectful collaboration with allies - community, individual, government, and
10 GERALD

P.

L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE

37 (1992)
11 Id. at 57-62.
112 Id. at 53.
'13 Id. at 55.
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even among themselves - was a model of rebellious community lawyering.
Consider the following examples.
The case was generated by community interest and action in collaboration
with the attorneys. When word of the SF YWCA's proposed sale came out,
Kimochi (a senior citizens program in Japantown) expressed interest in
purchasing the building. Paul Osaki, the executive director of the Japanese
Community and Cultural Center of Northern California, called together several
community groups to discuss the situation. One of the groups included in the
discussions was Nihonmachi Little Friends, so attorney Kai, as a Little Friends
board member, became involved. The goal was to take a united community
approach to acquire the building for community use, rather than to allow it to
be put to commercial use. In the summer of 1996, Kimochi was the organization that actively pursued purchasing the building from the SF YWCA. By
then, community rumors were circulating, raising the question of who truly
owned the building. Community members recalled contributing money toward
the purchase of the building, and a sense emerged that at the very least, the SF
YWCA had a moral responsibility to act equitably with the community. The
community groups, however, found the SF YWCA frustrating to deal with even
at this point.114 Kimochi assigned a volunteer with a financial background to
research the history of the building, and he discovered the trust language in the
YWCA minutes from the 1920s.' 15 Kimochi representatives were not sure if
the language meant anything, so they consulted with Kai, since she was one of
the only lawyers in the group. At this point, the group was looking for some
leverage - perhaps legal leverage - with the SF YWCA because the community was experiencing communications problems with the SF YWCA.1 16 There
was "community memory" of an analogous building just a few blocks from the
SF YWCA. That building served as the Japanese community center during
World War II and was never returned to the community. The Salvation Army
operated the building and sold it to the Chinese government to serve as a consulate. While the Salvation Army did create a fund in response to protests by the
community, the building was lost to the community and that experience was in
the community's mind when the SF YWCA sale was proposed.1" 7
Paul Osaki also turned to attorney Tamaki for assistance later in 1996.118
When legal claims of the trust needed to be asserted, the attorneys and the
community decided that Soko Bukai was in the best position to assert these
claims. Involving the churches was also critical in bringing in a real grassroots
constituency, which provided the impetus for collaborative efforts to engage in
community outreach and education on the issues. In fact, church leaders would
not act without the support of their congregations. Tamaki focused on working
Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
Id.; Memorandum from Robert Rusky, supra note 73; Brant T. Lee, A Racial Trust: the
Japanese YWCA and the Alien Land Law, 7 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (2001). The volunteer,
Al Gordon, was a retired bank executive, who recognized the importance of the trust language. Memorandum of Robert Rusky, supra note 73.
116 Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66. Kimochi ultimately purchased a
different building. Id.
117 Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66; Interview with Tamaki, supra
note 73.
114
115

118

Id.
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with the community and creating informational messages. The churches and
the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) hired interns to work on community education pieces. A petition drive was conducted, and three thousand
signatures in support of the action were gathered in a three-month period.
JACL offices held fundraising events to support the education efforts." 9
Ironically, the SF YWCA's own conduct in December 1996 inspired more
action on the part of the community which, by then, had been learning more
and more about the situation as a result of the ongoing community outreach.
That month, the SF YWCA moved its administrative functions into the building, which had the effect of squeezing out Little Friends and the Harrison program. The building had never been used for administration, and the move
escalated the conflict in the face of the community's formal assertions that a
trust covered the building. The community was insulted and frustrated by those
actions, and that was when the grassroots efforts grew stronger. The threat of
kicking out a preschool outraged the community; however, at a public SF
YWCA board meeting, board members refused to change their minds and
stated that any response would be in the form of a press release. This shocked
the community.' 20 The SF YWCA threatened to close the building, but community protests managed to convince the SF YWCA to back off from that
position.12
Much of the history that was an essential foundation to the case began to
emerge in 1996, after community education efforts began. As more facts were
revealed, the legal team and the community realized that they were dealing
with a part of history that had been lost. The revelation was galvanizing, the
facts lending real support and meaning to the slogans and the rhetoric that had
preceded. "Amazing" community events brought out and united the entire
community. Older Japanese Americans recalled what happened in the building,
22
and younger generations were able to learn and reclaim their history.'
Prior to the lawsuit, the Japanese American community attempted to put
political pressure on the SF YWCA through the San Francisco Board of Supervisors as well as the city's Human Rights Commission. The hope was to make
the SF YWCA realize that the issues involved far more than the private sale of
real property. Through educating the public and the SF YWCA about the community's history and the building's role, the goal was to resolve the conflict
without litigation. Kai then suggested approaching the Human Rights Commission. As a former member of the Commission, she knew that one of its responsibilities is to address intergroup tensions arising between communities in San
Francisco. Community-based individuals took the lead at the Commission;
Paul Osaki, Patty Wada of JACL, and Rev. Gary Barbaree from Pine Church
worked with the Commission to hold hearings and ultimately to pass a resolution in favor of Soko Bukai's position. Commission vice-chair Frank Chong,
an ally from the Chinese American community and the community college system, along with the chair, Martha Knutsen, appreciated the legal issue and tried
119 Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
120

id.
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Email from Karen Kai (Mar. 30, 2004).
Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
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12 3
to push the SF YWCA toward meaningful discussions with the community.
In the wake of the Commission hearing and resolution, the SF YWCA assured
Little Friends that the program could remain in the building on a month-tomonth basis, at least until it was sold. However, two weeks later, the SF
YWCA announced that the building was going to be closed and that Little
Friends would be evicted. The community felt betrayed once again: the SF
the building had to be secured in order to
YWCA could not be trusted and124
assure continued community use.
The Japanese American community had strong support from the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, led by Supervisors Mabel Teng and Reverend
Amos Brown. Paul Osaki lobbied Teng and secured her involvement, but attorney Kai knew that Teng was a potential ally because Teng's children had
attended the Nihonmachi Little Friends program as preschoolers. The Board of
Supervisors held a hearing in March 1997 and passed a resolution in favor of
Soko Bukai's position. A couple of years later, at a Day of Remembrance
gathering, Tom Ammiano, president of the Board of Supervisors, and Supervisor Michael Yaki came out to the rally in support of the community.125
The day the lawsuit was served on the SF YWCA, the legal team and
community representatives held a press conference and received good media
coverage. The event included a taiko drum performance by Little Friends
SF YWCA complained that the litigants "had their
preschoolers. Later ' the
26
drumbeaters in toW. 1
After the lawsuit was filed, the community and the Soko Bukai attorneys
continued to reach out to the media. Television news coverage featured stories
on internment and its effects on the Japanese American community, and the
San Francisco Examiner ran this favorable editorial:
It's one thing to hire combative lawyers to win a property law case on technicalities
that don't take into account a horrid history of racism and segregation. It's quite
another to emerge unwounded from the muddy battlefield of public opinion .... The
should
YWCA, after considering the effect of this dispute on future fund-raising, 127
graciously return the property title to the churches that built it 65 years ago.

An important community event took place in February 1999, a couple
years after the lawsuit had been filed, while the SF YWCA remained intransigent in its position. For many years, the Japanese American community had
held a Day of Remembrance, comprised of a series of events as a somber
memorial to World War Ii internment. 128 The theme of the 1999 event was
"unfinished business,"' 29 and a variety of community groups, churches, artists,
performers, and individuals participated. While a number of items were discussed, the Japanese YWCA case was one of the main issues addressed.130 In
fact, the keynote speaker, Professor Mari Matsuda, selected the YWCA as the
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Interview of Donald Tamaki, Soko Bukai attorney, Apr. 15, 2002; Matsuda, supra note
20, at 29.
129 Matsuda, supra note 20, at 29-30.
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central topic of her address."' When the SF YWCA learned that it would be a
target of criticism at the event, its leadership wrote a letter to the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors and the city attorney charging that this was an abuse of
city funding, because some city funds supported the event. 132 Attorney Kai
responded to the criticism before the Board of Supervisors: "When I look at a
letter like this I'm saddened that an organization that calls itself a civil rights
organization seeks to censor a community. They denigrated us, they sought to
'
erase our history, and now they attack our own Day of Remembrance." 133
The
city attorney responded that this was not a misuse of public funds, and an outraged Supervisor Michael Yaki joined protestors in addressing a news crew at
the building, demanding that the SF YWCA retract its accusations. 134 The next
day, the SF YWCA chose a different tactic by hoisting a banner over its building reading: "The YWCA honors the Day of Remembrance." 135 However, the
last minute strategy did little to repair the damage. That evening, a dinner
honoring the Korematsu legal team (that of course included Kai, Tamaki, and
Rusky) was held just blocks away.136 The ceremony ended with a candle-lighting and a pledge in honor of those who had been interned. Flag-bearing Boy
Scouts led the hundreds of participants on a candlelight march directly toward
the YWCA building. SF YWCA leaders were in the building holding its own
reception, which did not include any members of the community. Attorney
Kai, dressed in traditional taiko attire, pounded a taiko drum as part of a group
of four generations of Japanese Americans, including the elderly, that surrounded the building. Community leaders delivered riveting speeches, including Supervisor Yaki who exclaimed, "[t]his building is a symbol of our
community. It is a symbol of a community that we used to have here, before
we were sent to camps .... And we will continue to fight for this building
every day, until it is firmly committed and remains in the hands of the Japanese
American community of San Francisco." 137 As a result, even greater commu38
nity attention, focus and energy emerged, along with wider media coverage. 1
By spring 1999, Soko Bukai attorneys also garnered the support of the
California legislature. Assemblyman Mike Honda, himself a former internee,
contacted Patty Wada about preparing a resolution for the upcoming Day of
Remembrance. Wada contacted Kai, who drafted a resolution that focused on
the 1830 Sutter Street controversy. Honda decided that the resolution merited
its own effort, and a team was formed to work on that effort. Kai and Rusky
worked with Honda's office to refine the language and developed an information package for lobbying other state legislators. Honda (who has since been
elected to the U.S. Congress) represented the San Jose, California area, so San
Francisco state legislators, Carole Migden and Keven Shelley, were recruited as
early co-sponsors. Patty Wada used her JACL expertise to help with the follow
Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
Interview of Donald Tamaki, supra note 73; Matsuda, supra note 20, at 30.
133 Id. at 31.
131 Interview of Donald Tamaki, supra note 73.
135 Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.; Matsuda, supra note 20, at 33.
136 Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
137 Matsuda, supra note 20, at 33-34.
138 Id.; Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
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up to the legislation. She worked with interns to develop an informational
board that was prominently displayed in the State Capitol and coordinated lobbying visits to various legislators. Rusky and Kai participated in some of the
lobbying trips with other community members. Despite an attempt by the SF
YWCA to head off the legislation, Honda was able to secure unanimous passage of ACR (Assembly Concurrent Resolution) 32 on March 23, 1999.139 The
resolution process through the state legislature provided the community and the
legal team a powerful vehicle to raise the issue of the lasting effects of the
racism rooted in the alien land law. The idea that the State would make an
affirmative commitment to redress the effects of a racially motivated statute
moved the resolution beyond the status of an honorary declaration. The opportunity to have the story of the Issei women recognized in the State's official
records gave the community a way to take the underlying historical discrimination issue statewide. By that time, the community's major target audience was
no longer the SF YWCA. Given the SF YWCA leadership's prior indifference
- even hostility - to community and official actions, the Soko Bukai legal team
did not think that the legislature's action, no matter how extraordinary, would
cause the SF YWCA to concede. For the community, however, the legislature's recognition of the issues, the facts and the injustice was very important.14 ° ACR 32 declares:
WHEREAS, The California Alien Land Law was enacted in 1913 in an atmosphere
of racial prejudice and barred Japanese immigrants and their charitable religious
organizations from owning real property; and
WHEREAS, In response to the California Alien Land Law, Japanese Americans
legally entered into trust agreements with non-Japanese to hold their property in
another's name so they might establish their roots in this country and build a stable
and lasting community; and
WHEREAS, Japanese immigrant women of the Soko Bukai, an association of Japanese Christian churches in San Francisco, established a Japanese YWCA in that city
in 1912 to work with Japanese women and girls; and
WHEREAS, In 1920-21, the Japanese YWCA raised the funds to purchase the building and property, with the San Francisco YWCA Board agreeing to hold this property
in trust for the permanent use of the Japanese YWCA; and ....
WHEREAS, Programs and services of the Japanese YWCA were abruptly ended in
1942 when Executive Order Number 9066 forcibly removed all Japanese Americans
from the West Coast to inland concentration camps; and ....
WHEREAS, the Soko Bukai, whose Issei women members founded the Japanese
YWCA, today reasserts the Japanese American community's claim to the Japanese
YWCA building; and ....
WHEREAS, The San Francisco YWCA's refusal to honor the trust agreement and
fulfill its duties as trustee allows the YWCA to profit from the racism of the California Alien Land Law; . . . now, therefore be it
Resolved by the Assembly of the State of California, the Senate thereof concurring,
that the Legislature of the State of California declares that it shall be the policy of the
state to eradicate any vestiges of the racism of the California Alien Land Law and to
139
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take steps to ensure the enforcement of charitable trust created in response to that
law; and ....
Resolved that the Legislature pays tribute to the contributions,
tenacity, and vision of
14
the Issei women pioneers of the State of California. 1

Community events and rallies did not subside as the litigation proceeded.

In July 2001, a rally was held to demonstrate community support in anticipation of the upcoming trial. The event was held at the community center - right
next to 1830 Sutter Street. The attorneys helped to plan the event and assisted
in deciding who would appear on stage to discuss the connection to the past.
Four hundred supporters and several members of the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors attended. The Reverend Cecil Williams, the famous African
American leader of Glide Memorial Church, delivered a stirring speech, praising the efforts of the community, especially elderly members of the Japanese
YWCA in their nineties who were in attendance. Later, a dinner was held,
where speakers reminded the audience of the founding Issei women and what
the fight represented. Another candlelight march was held,
inspiring and fur42
ther energizing the participants and legal team members. 1
Through rebellious lawyering, the Soko Bukai legal team's actions were
transparent, and the community's involvement, through education, outreach,
and participation, gave the community ownership of the case. The team
partnered with the community in a respectful way. Before the lawsuit was
filed, a collaborative effort was used to try to reach an agreement with the SF
YWCA, while community education efforts were implemented. After the suit
was filed, pleadings, especially those prepared by pro bono counsel who were
not as familiar with the community, were reshaped to reflect community perspectives. Pleadings were shared with the community in order to keep the community informed. Community meetings and education forums continued. The
resulting relationship was clear: "Folks [throughout the community] view us as
representing them. Folks on the street would walk up to us and ask us how the
case is going. There was a general feeling of ownership of the issue - and as
the lawyers we represent all those interests."' 143 For the Soko Bukai legal team,
this was not simply a matter of representing a client; this was about community
building. 1"
VII.

SEnrLEMENT

After the parties were finally assigned to a judge for the anticipated trial, a
status conference was scheduled for November 27, 2001. At the status conference, the trial judge set the trial to begin in six weeks, but ordered the parties to
try one more time to settle the matter before the trial. As Soko Bukai attorney
Donald Tamaki noted, "when you are looking down the barrel of a trial date, it
people to the table."1 45

focuses people's minds. It has a way of bringing
According to SF YWCA attorney Peter Hart, "[w]e were all set to go to trial.
H.R. 32, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 1999).
Interview of Tracie Brown, supra note 105.
141 Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
144 Interview of Karen Kai, supra note 54.
145 Interview of Donald Tamaki, supra note 73.
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In early February they called us. I didn't have much expectation that the case
settle, but I said sure let's go ahead and do it. It took a couple of
would 46
days."'

1

Under the terms of the settlement, Nihonmachi Little Friends, the multicultural childcare center, would be permitted to purchase the "entire property"
(the 1830 Sutter building and the 1834 lot) for $733,000 and would bear an
ongoing duty to provide community education on the history of the building
and preserve the building for community use. 14 7 The $733,000 figure deserves
further scrutiny.
The media reported that the "parties settled the dispute" for $733,000. 148
Cathy Inamasu, the executive director of Nihonmachi Little Friends, indicates
that the property cost her program $733,000. 149 And attorneys for Soko Bukai
also point out that both the side lot and the building were obtained for
$733,000.'15 Yet curiously, perhaps demonstrating a bit of ego, the executive
director of the SF YWCA directed a letter to the editor in response to a story
stating that the parties had "settled the dispute" with the childcare center,
"obtain[ing] ownership of the building for $733,000, less than half the commercial value." 15 ' Her letter stated that the "YWCA settled the case for a total" of
$1.5 million, including proceeds from the sale of its building, not $733,000. 152
Moreover, the YWCA's attorneys stated that their client "received a very fair
sum of money for the building."' 53 Did the community actually pay more than
the $733,000? The answer is no. 15 4 Soko Bukai attorneys have confirmed that
the SF YWCA received a total of $1.5 million as part of the settlement, but
only $733,000 came from the community. The remainder came from an anonysource that the parties, or at least the attorneys, agreed
mous "non-community"
55
to keep confidential.1
Who was this "non-community" source? One educated guess is the SF
YWCA's insurance company. In the early stages of the litigation, a question
was raised over whether the respondent's insurance coverage included the
defense of this type of legal dispute. The law firm of Wright, Robinson,
Osthimer & Tatum was brought in to "put pressure on the insurance [company]
146 Interview of Peter Hart, supra note 40.
147 Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.; Interview of Cathy Inamasu,
Executive Director, Nihonmachi Little Friends (May 16, 2002).

148

See, e.g., An 80-year-old Diary Helps End a Legal Dispute, THE

RECORDER,

June 24,

2002, at 4; Avy Mallik, supra note 1.
149 Interview of Cathy Inamasu, supra note 147.
150 Interview of Donald Tamaki, supra note 73; Interview of Karen Kai and Robert Rusky,
supra note 66.
151 See Ann Kennedy, Diary Played No Part, THE RECORDER, July 3, 2002, at 2.
152 See id.
153 Interview of Peter Hart, supra note 40.
154 Cathy Inamasu, executive director of Nihonmachi Little Friends has been clear.
[The community attorneys] left it up to us as to what our max was because of course it would
rely on us ultimately to raise the money. The board decided and based it on what we thought we
could raise for the purchase. Luckily, it came under what our max was. We were happy about
that. The entire property is costing $733,000.

Interview of Cathy Inamasu, supra note 147.
155 Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
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to fund the defense of the case."' 156 Succeeding in that effort, the same firm
took over the case for the SF YWCA, representing the respondent in all phases
of discovery, trial preparation, motions, and mediation.15 7 As the SF YWCA
began to be inundated by negative publicity, counsel for the respondent also put
158
pressure on the insurance company to pay for a public relations consultant.
As the trial loomed and the outcome was uncertain with the prospect of having
to pay damages and further attorney's fees, it is not out of the question that the
SF YWCA's insurance company decided to make up the difference between
what the community contributed ($733,000) and a reasonable sale amount ($1.5
million) through a contribution to the SF YWCA. Once the insurance carrier
acknowledged a duty to defend, the prospect of paying out more and more
attorney's fees over prolonged litigation and appeals likely led to its decision to
contribute over $750,000 to the final settlement.15 9 The attorney's fees paid by
the insurance company up to that point was likely over $1 million; after 1all,
60
Soko Bukai's attorneys had already donated over $2 million in legal time.
VIII.

PROPRIETY OF SETTLEMENT

One basic description of the settlement - $733,000 from the community
for property that the Japanese Americans thought was theirs in the first place may not evoke immediate praise from those who are sympathetic with the community's perspective. Was the settlement good, and if so, from whose perspective? Presenting the basic description of Soko Bukai v. YWCA to students
have
generally elicits a response along the lines of "why should the community
16 1
to pay anything for the property. It was theirs to begin with."'
Obviously, deciding whether to settle any particular case involves weighing a number of factors, and certainly that was the situation in this case. In
post-settlement interviews with the Soko Bukai legal representatives and the
executive director of Nihonmachi Little Friends, the final settlement was justified on a number of grounds.
A.

Responsibilityfor the building and the trust.

The petitioner, Soko Bukai, was not interested in becoming a property
owner.' 62 A willing, non-party entity was needed, and Nihonmachi Little
Friends (NLF or "Little Friends") filled the need.
[Soko Bukai] is just a loose federation of the three churches. It felt that it wasn't
prepared to take on the building even if the court awarded it. We felt the YWCA
breached its fiduciary duties as trustee so it was not fit to be trustee. But Soko Bukai
was not inclined to be property owners. So a series of meetings were held to determine if there was interest among other community organizations to play that role - to
156 Interview of Peter Hart, supra note 1.
157Id.

158 Id.; Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
159 Telephone interview of Robert Hing, attorney at law and insurance specialist, Scottsdale,
Arizona (Mar. 7, 2004).
160 Interview of Donald Tamaki, supra note 73..
161 See, e.g., Rebecca B. Jackson, Soko Bukai Negotiation Reflection, Mar. 4, 2004 (unpublished paper on file with author).
162 Interview of Donald Tamaki, supra note 73; Interview of Inamasu, supra note 147.
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be offered to the court as a possible trustee of the building. Most of the other organizations were burdened by their own buildings. At the time NLF was looking for a
building. They are a very stable organization and they are multi-cultural, multiracial. They had been operating out of the building for 15 years. So they stepped up
and said if they can pay a price they can afford, they would participate. So there was
63
a sigh of relief. Everyone wants them in the community and wants them to stay.1
[Soko Bukai] really didn't want to be the owners of the building - they did want to
save and preserve
the building. But it was outside their normal scope to have to own
64
the building.
As Little Friends understood things:
[F]rom the beginning the attorneys were saying that if [Soko Bukai] won the case...
the question of who would be trustee [had to be answered] ....[T]he attorneys' idea
was to set up a nonprofit organization... that would represent the different sectors of
the community [and] would act as trustees for the building ....[NLF] would become
master tenant .... So it wasn't the best scenario for us .... [S]ettlement was a
whole different thing. We could
negotiate with the [YWCA] that [NLF] would buy
165
the whole place - everything.

As much as the Soko Bukai legal team would have liked to try the case,
the settlement got the community to where it "wanted to be."' 6 6 Little Friends
would have a "permanent place," and it was "an appropriate group to67carry on
the trust purposes" of providing community service and education.'
B.

Avoiding further litigation and delay.
The SF YWCA placed a for sale sign on the building in 1996, the litiga-

tion began in 1997, and the case was finally settled in early 2002. If Soko
Bukai had prevailed at trial, its attorneys were certain that the SF YWCA

would have appealed, and the resolution of the case would have taken several
more years. 168 Several of the witnesses for the petitioner were elderly, and it

was important to give them a positive resolution to the conflict. Also, their
effectiveness
at a trial was in question. Thus, settlement provided "closure" on
69
the case.'
[W]e avoid two years, maybe three years, of appeals. The aggressive way the
YWCA fought the case, they most certainly were going to appeal the case. An example of an incident that led us to [that belief] was that they made a borderline frivolous
motion to disqualify certain members of our legal team for violating certain rules of
discovery. I thought the chances of them winning on that motion was next to zero.
They appealed it to the Court of Appeal and lost and they appealed to the California
Supreme Court and lost again. Most litigants don't do that. It was a basic
decision to
170
grind us and the community down. For them, money was no issue.
163
t1
165
166

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
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Id.

of
of
of
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Donald Tamaki, supra note 73.
Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66.
Cathy Inamasu, supra note 147..
Tracie Brown, supra note 105.

168 Id.
169 Interview of Donald Tamaki, supra note 73.
170 Id.Robert Rusky put it this way:
[I]t struck me when Lily Abiko died in November 2001 that time was definitely not on our side,
not because it prevented us from prevailing in the litigation - I was fairly confident about that but because if the case dragged on for several more years through trial and appeals, we would be
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So even if Soko Bukai had won at trial, "it would have been years before
' 171
this case would be actually over in terms of post-trial briefing and appeals."
C.

Inclusion of the Side Lot.

If the case had proceeded to trial and Soko Bukai prevailed on issues
related to the 1830 building, recovery of the "side lot" (1834 Sutter) for the
community was not a sure bet. 172 And the fair market value of the side lot was
not insignificant:
[T]he side lot added a tremendous value to the property. This was added to the
building in the [19]60s. It would have been very hard to win on the side lot. My
thought is that we would have won the building, [but] we would have lost on the side
lot. When we were in settlement agreements, we both got appraisers to appraise the
side lot. Our appraiser appraised the side lot at $400,000 and their appraiser valued it
at $1M. Who is right, I don't know. But173
the fact that we get both the side lot and the
building for $733K makes sense to me.

The side lot playground area was vital to the Little Friends daycare
program: "'
We thought about if we didn't have access to the playground what would we do. Our
other site is directly behind us and at one point we had talked to an architect about
how we could connect the two properties so that we could have access from this
building [1830 Sutter] directly back to the playground behind us. It's possible, [but]
it wouldn't be the best situation for us. It would also take out part of the backstage
[of our] theater.., dressing rooms ...and office.., to make kind of like an elevator
to get to the level of playground behind us. That wouldn't have been the best situation, but that was a possible scenario if we couldn't get
the [1834 Sutter] playground
175
lot. For us, the whole package was really the best.
D.

Maintenancefees owed to YWCA.

The SF YWCA took a position that if Soko Bukai prevailed at trial, then
the community would owe the SF YWCA $3 million for maintaining the buildlosing the very few elders who were involved in the Japanese YWCA even as kids. I wanted
them to have the satisfaction of seeing the community regain the building and to feel that the
struggle that began in 1920-21 with the subterfuge to avoid the Alien Land Law had been completed. I wanted the community to see that completion with them. I wanted this not out of
sentimentality, or even because of the symbolic meaning of their personal experience of completion, but because to be able to secure the building in their lifetimes was a measure of respect for
and a way of honoring what they had given in their time.
Memorandum of Robert Rusky, supra note 73.
171 Interview of Tracie Brown, supra note 105.
172 Interview of Donald Tamaki, supra note 73.
173 id.
174 Id.

175 Interview of Cathy Inamasu, supra note 147. Since Little Friends needed the playground
space for the preschoolers, the attorneys felt that inclusion of the lot in any settlement was
important. Given the valuation range for the side lot, the $733,000 settlement from Little
Friends could be justified for the purchase of the side lot alone. Seen in that light, the community was not buying a building the community had already paid for, but was securing a
value for the building property that it may not have been able to obtain otherwise. Memorandum from Robert Rusky, supra note 73.
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ing for so many years. 1 7 6 Perhaps the community could demand that the price
rent, but these issues
be discounted for years that the SF YWCA did not pay
177
litigation.
additional
or
separate
demanded
have
may
E.

Unclear trial outcome.

In post-settlement conversations, counsel for both parties expressed confidence in their positions. Peter Hart, one of the SF YWCA attorneys stated:
I think we [had a pretty strong case]. The biggest hurdle they face[d] was their
motive for the trust did not seem to be there. The alien land laws did not seem to
prohibit this. If you go one step further and say a trust was created but a merger
occurred. If there was a trust and a merger occurred, then there is a laches argument
we had good points on the
and a statue of limitations argument.
1 78 We also thought
standing and capacity arguments.

The attorneys for Soko Bukai expressed similar confidence. Donald
Tamaki felt that Peter Hart was "wrong on the historical point of view and legal
point of view," and that the Soko Bukai legal team was "clearly prepared" for
1 79
Tracie Brown expressed
the opponent's motion for summary judgment.
this would be a fabulous
since
to
trial
going
weren't
we
that
"disappointment
case to try." ' 8 o And although Robert Rusky acknowledged that "Y's statute of
limitations and laches arguments ... raised some concern," the legal team was
"confident we would prevail on those defenses."' 81
Given the confidence that both sides expressed in their positions, one
could reasonably conclude that the actual outcome of a trial was not preordained. Of course, both sides were aware of the relative strengths of their
own positions, which contributed to their willingness to settle.
While these factors may provide simple answers to why the case was settled, they do not necessarily answer the question of whether the case should
have been settled. In other words, are there policy reasons why the case should
not have been settled?
F.

Was settlement appropriateunder the circumstances?

Owen Fiss has raised several philosophical arguments against settlement.1 82 He is troubled by the general possibility that when a case is settled,
justice in fact may not be achieved. Indeed, settlement may simply represent a
"capitulation to the conditions of mass society." I agree that there is frustration
inherent in litigation that prevents adjudication of many important issues issues important to parties and society at large. Unfortunately, at times it seems
that only parties with deep pockets are able to afford litigation; this is frustrating. So I understand the need to resist settlement, especially when a subordinated party is involved.
176

Interview of Donald Tamaki, supra note 73.

177

id.

Interview of Peter Hart, supra note 40.
id.
180 Interview of Tracie Brown, supra note 105.
181 Interview of Karen Kai and Bob Rusky, supra note 66; Memorandum from Robert
Rusky, supra note 73.
182 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
178

179
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Fiss is particularly and understandably concerned when one party is substantially poorer than the other party:
The disparities in resources between the parties can influence the settlement in three
ways. First, the poorer party may be less able to amass and analyze the information
needed to predict the outcome of the litigation, and thus be disadvantaged in the
bargaining process. Second, he may need the damages he seeks immediately and
thus be induced to settle as a way of accelerating payment, even though he realizes he
would get less now than he might if he awaited judgment. All plaintiffs want their
damages immediately, but an indigent plaintiff may be exploited by a rich defendant
because his need is so great that the defendant can force him to accept a sum that is
less than the ordinary present value of the judgment. Third, the poorer party might
be forced to settle because he does not have the resources to finance the litigation, to
cover either his own projected expenses, such as his lawyer's time, or the expenses
his opponent can impose through the manipulation of procedural mechanisms such as
discovery. It might seem that settlement benefits the plaintiff by allowing him to
avoid the costs of litigation, but this is not so. The defendant can anticipate the
plaintiff's costs if the case were to be tried fully and decrease his offer by that
amount.8 3The indigent plaintiff is a victim of the costs of litigation even if he
1
settles.

Fiss' first two points do not seem relevant in Soko Bukai v. YWCA.
Assuming for the sake of analysis that Soko Bukai is the "poorer party," the pro
bono counsel that represented the petitioner appeared to be quite competent and
able to "amass and analyze the information" in order to assess the outcome of a
trial. At the very least, they seemed to have as much information as the
YWCA's representatives to determine the likelihood of success at trial. Fiss'
second point of whether the Soko Bukai or the Japanese American community
needed "damages" immediately is also not relevant. The community was not
seeking monetary damages. However, a corollary question that may indeed be
relevant is whether a sense of urgency was attached to the community's desire
to have the building. Certainly, one could argue that the community wanted to
put the case to rest sooner rather than later and was too willing to come up with
the money to accomplish that goal. Similarly, the YWCA, also a community
service agency, may have wanted to settle the matter before drawing the matter
out further so that it could get on with its community work and avoid further
public criticism. Even if these theories were true, that is not the same type of
pressure that Fiss is concerned with in terms of a poor party who needs cash

right away to spend. Arguably, for the Japanese American community, the
issue was not how soon it would receive damages, but rather how soon, if at all,
it could formally claim the property and put it back to community use.
Thus, the issue remains whether Soko Bukai lacked the "resources to
finance the litigation." On its face, disparity in resources is not the case here, at
least in the sense that Fiss writes. While the resources of the YWCA were

considerable (insurance company paying for the defense), the volunteer attorneys for Soko Bukai were determined to match the effort and time that went
into litigation. At least the quality of Soko Bukai's legal representation did not
183 Id. at 1076 (emphasis added). Richard Delgado also has questioned whether informal
processes are unfair to disempowered and subordinated groups. See generally Richard Delgado, Fairnessand Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudicein Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359.
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appear to suffer from its lack of resources. Since Soko Bukai had the resources
necessary to continue this case to trial, settlement was not some desperate ploy
to get something out of this whole situation. Money was not as much of a
motivating factor as it would have been if this case were based on a straight
cash reimbursement. Soko Bukai and its counsel also had unquantifiable community resources, in terms of emotional and psychic support, and classic rebellious-style use of community and political allies. On the other hand, in terms of
money to cover litigation expenses, Soko Bukai was less certain of future
funds. Certainly, continued community fundraising success to cover litigation
expenses is, at the very least, unpredictable. Also, even though the firms were
doing the work pro bono, one has to wonder if these firms would encourage
settlement rather than become involved in a lengthy, costly trial.
Yet, Tamaki, Kai, and Rusky might very well have been willing to devote
their lives to this case. This "human capital" acts to level the playing field, so
one side could not take advantage of the other as Fiss fears. Many pro bono
lawyers working on public cases are in it for the long haul because of their
dedication to the cause and the issues. Others like the good public image that
flows from such representation; this may be more important than earning a fee.
Since the lawyers were from the community, concerns that they were settling
simply because of financial constraints or considerations may be alleviated. On
the other hand, because the lawyers had a personal stake in the matter, 184 they
may have settled to gain some assurance that the building would not be lost. In
other words, were the Soko Bukai attorneys more eager to settle due to fear that
if they lost the building, they would face hostility from their own community?
Would more "objective" attorneys have been willing to take the risk of losing it
all or winning it all in court? I think not. The Soko Bukai attorneys were
beloved and appreciated by the community because of their efforts, not because
of a win-loss record.
But Fiss does raise an interesting challenge to the Soko Bukai settlement
based on the fact that the petitioners are representatives of a larger community:
These problems become even more pronounced when we turn from organizations
and consider the fact that much contemporary litigation involves even more nebulous
social entities, namely, groups. Some of these groups, such as ethnic or racial minorities, inmates of prisons, or residents of institutions for mentally retarded people, may
have an identity or existence that transcends the lawsuit, but they do not have any
structure and therefore lack any procedures for generating
formal organizational1 85
authoritative consent.

Fiss is raising a question that has serious implications in the Soko Bukai
settlement if we view Soko Bukai as a representative of a social group. He
might believe that settlement was not appropriate here because the Japanese
American community got less than what it deserved. And in settling, Soko
Bukai and its attorneys spoke on behalf of the entire Japanese American com184 As one of the attorneys for Soko Bukai stated:
I had Japanese American friends who would jokingly say, "We're going to win the building
right?" That was the downside of having this wonderful community involvement because I

thought if we lose, all these people will be so upset.
Interview of Tracie Brown, supra note 105.
185 Fiss, supra note 182, at 1079.
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munity - a community with members who may not have agreed with the terms
of the settlement. This would not be surprising. We know that many African
Americans back in the Brown v. Board of Education era may have preferred
more resources for their separate schools rather than integration. 1 86 In other
words, in the Soko Bukai case, many community members may have wanted
the case to go to trial based on the firm belief that the Japanese American
community deserved the building without having to pay anything for it.. Even
if they lost at trial, some community members may have preferred a public trial
of the issues related to the injustice of the alien land laws and the exacerbating
effects of internment and economic injustices visited on Japanese Americans.
The Fiss critique raises the question of who Soko Bukai represented and
who Kai, Rusky, and Tamaki represented. The attorneys acknowledge that this
was an action that came "up out of the community."' 87 Community groups and
individuals were upset at the injustice that the proposed YWCA sale reprewas no real client for purposes of a lawsuit until Soko Bukai
sented, but there
"stepped up."' 8 8 The attorneys acknowledged that even "though Soko Bukai
was our immediate client, we were responsible to the entire community."' 8 9 So
one might be nagged by the question of whether the agents who decided to
settle on behalf of Soko Bukai fully considered the wishes of the group (the
Japanese American community) that they represented. In earlier phases of the
lawsuit when the case was being mediated, the community could not be consulted because the mediation talks were confidential.' 9 ° Also, whose wishes
were relevant? Should it matter to the settlement how the current community,
beyond those represented by the interests of Soko Buaki, wishes to use the
property? Is maintaining the trust's purpose more important than putting the
building to a different use that may be more necessary in modern times?
The response to this Fiss critique may not be completely satisfactory, but
it is a good one. Kai, Tamaki, and Rusky knew the community. They were
from the community. They knew what the community valued. They knew its
strengths and its limitations. They were rebellious community lawyers who
respected the wide array of friends, relatives, and community workers who
made up the community. Their community-centric sense of phronesis is
unquestioned. 19 ' In helping to hammer out the final settlement there is no dispute that if anyone could "generat[e] authoritative consent" from "nebulous
For example, some black educators in Kansas City argue that instead of worrying about
racial-balance quotas, schools should worry about providing a quality education to all students. See Doug Peters, 'Separate But Equal' Returns to Nation's Schools, ARK. DEMO186

CRAT-GAzE-rE, Sept. 30, 1997, at Al.
187 Interview of Karen Kai, supra note 54.
188

Id.

189 Interview of Don Tamaki, supra note 73.
190 "One of the downsides of the mediation was that because the mediation was confidential
we couldn't talk to the community about what was happening. The attempts to negotiate was
frustrating because we couldn't report to the community." Interview of Karen Kai and Bob
Rusky, supra note 66.
191 Louis Brandeis believed that lawyers were particularly qualified for public service
because they embodied Aristotelian phronesis, or practical wisdom. Louis D. Brandeis, The
Opportunity in the Law, Address Before the Harvard Ethical Society (May 4, 1905), in
BUSINESS - A PROFESSION 392 (1917).
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social entities" that is Fiss's concern, it was these representatives. As they met
with the Soko Bukai leaders and brought in Nihonmachi Little Friends, they
surely acted in the best interest of a very well informed community. When the
outcome was announced, great public support and sympathy for the settlement
was expressed, further evincing the credibility of the settlement. Moreover,
those in the Japanese American community who may have pushed for a more
aggressive stance early on in the litigation likely had the chance to make their
opinions known to Soko Bukai leaders as well as to the lawyers who were in
the community. Hopefully, the attorneys for Soko Bukai settled with some
sense that the majority of the community preferred settlement. If that is the
case, greater good was achieved by settlement.
Furthermore, if no one like Soko Bukai had stepped forward to be "the
client" so that an action could be brought, then, from all indications, the property could have been sold to condominium developers. In that case, Fiss's concern over justice for a nebulous social group would remain a mere theoretical
"what-if-a-suit-had-been-brought" concern rather than the practical one that is
being raised. Thus, the community was clearly better off that Soko Bukai
became the representative so that retention of the building for community use
could be facilitated.
Fiss is also troubled by the possibility that settlement may bring peace, but
not necessarily justice:
In our political system, courts are reactive institutions. They do not search out interpretive occasions, but instead wait for others to bring matters to their attention. They
also rely for the most part on others to investigate and present the law and facts. A
settlement will thereby deprive a court of the occasion, and perhaps even the ability,
to render an interpretation. A court cannot proceed (or not proceed very far) in the
face of a settlement. To be against settlement is not to urge that parties be "forced"
to litigate, since that would interfere with their autonomy and distort the adjudicative
process; the parties will be inclined to make the court believe that their bargain is
justice. To be against settlement is only to suggest that when the parties settle, society gets less than what appears, and for a price it does not know it is paying. Parties
might settle while leaving justice undone. The settlement of a school suit might
secure the peace, but not racial equality. Although the parties are prepared to live
under the terms they bargained for, and although such peaceful coexistence may be a
necessary precondition of justice, and itself a state of affairs to be valued, it is not
justice itself. To settle for something means to accept less than some ideal. 192

This case involved more than just the monetary value of the building. It
was about justice and restitution for Japanese Americans, who were discriminated against initially (hence, the necessity of creating a trust) and now are
victims once again. Perhaps if this case had gone to trial, it would have set a
precedent for other Japanese Americans who had property held in trust as a
result of internment. Maybe a court victory over the SF YWCA would have
meant more to the Japanese American community than merely getting to buy
the building at a fair price. There could have been more issues of right and
wrong than just what price was fair. Soko Bukai was representing the interests
of a community that was upset at the injustices of the past and disrespected by
the strategies of the modern SF YWCA; perhaps Soko Bukai owed it to their
192

Fiss, supra note 182, at 1085-86.
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supporters not to "give in" to the pressures of the SF YWCA and, in the view
of Fiss, fight for justice rather than just settle for peace.
An argument can be made that, except for time (which, of course is a not
small matter), Soko Bukai had nothing to lose by going to trial, and, therefore,
should have gone to trial. What other offers did the YWCA receive? If the
only offer was from the community anyway and if Soko Bukai failed at trial,
the community may still have been able to purchase the property. So perhaps
the risk of litigation was low for Soko Bukai in the scheme of things. With that
in mind, the settlement caused the community to pay significant amounts of
money for something that the community felt it already owned. In addition,
they lost a chance for some of the emotional benefits that winning the litigation
could have had for the community. Settlement seemed to only save time,
ensure the community's ownership, and cost a lot of money. Perhaps the community would have been better served by going to trial under the
circumstances.
But one cannot assume that justice was not served by the settlement.
While arguing that the Soko Bukai settled for something less than ideal is
appealing, assessing what is ideal involves fair consideration of several factors.
Time was a concern in the sense that witnesses were elderly (and therefore in
some cases unreliable) and the case could have dragged on for several more
years. By the time the case settled, the SF YWCA was no longer in dire financial straits. If the SF YWCA had prevailed at trial, the building might have
gone to condominium developers or the SF YWCA could have just maintained
it for its own administrative use without permitting other community-based
uses. And from the SF YWCA's perspective, achieving a sense of justice was
not a simple matter. While prevailing at trial might appear at first blush to
accomplish "justice" from the perspective that SF YWCA's position would
have been legally vindicated, its reputation could have been further tarnished in
the media and certainly in the Japanese American community. Counter-intuitively, if the SF YWCA did not want its reputation to be further sullied, settlement may have been a better course than winning at trial. As its counsel
pointed out:
I think the Y recognized at the end of the day, through the efforts of the judge
involved, that even if you [the SF YWCA] won the case, you [the SF YWCA] would
still lose. There would be a segment of the population that would believe that the
building was a community asset, that the Y was not entitled to it. Even if we were
able to prove that there was no trust, the general feeling would have been that the
only reason it happened was the passage of time. That if they [the Japanese community] had acknowledged their duties early on after the war, the people involved would
have still been alive, and this would have gotten to the rightful solution. So my view
is if we had won the case, we would still have people chained to the building. So93it
became a case in the Y's interest where it was better to settle than not to settle.'

However, Fiss warns that in some cases, there may have been a "genuine
social need for an authoritative interpretation of the law" that is foreclosed by
settlement. He reminds us that "[a]ll cases are not equal [e.g., desegregation
cases] ....The settlement movement must introduce a qualitative perspective;
193

Interview of Peter Hart, supra note 40.
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these more 'significant' cases, and demonstrate the propriety of
it must speak to194
settling them."
From one perspective, the issue in this case concerns a public entity taking
advantage of an historically underrepresented population. It also concerns
other public issues of racial discrimination. These are issues that should be
made public so that others can learn from these experiences, especially in light
of the injustices committed and arguably now perpetuated against the Japanese
American community. The case could have been helpful in clarifying the historical issues.
David Luban expands on this Fissian perspective:
[A]djudication, which produces rules and precedents, is instrumentally useful
because these provide a normative framework for future transactions. However,
legal rules and precedents are valuable not only as a source of certainty, but also as a
reasoned elaboration and visible expression of public values. Law on this view
amounts to what Hegel called "objective spirit" - the spirit of a political community
manifested in a public and objective form.
When a case settles, it does so on terms agreeable to its parties, but those terms are
not necessarily illuminating to the law or to the public. Indeed those terms may be
harnful to the public. Instead of reasoned reconsideration of the law, we often find
little more than a bare announcement of how much money changed hands .... 195

This Luban/Fiss concern has some validity here. The Soko Bukai case
presents a strong public-life issue. The suit involved property that was dear and
symbolic to the San Francisco Japanese American community. It also involved
historical prejudice against Japanese Americans. The case could have been a
useful vehicle to fill a gap in the law. Without doubt, the recognition of a trust
theory as advocated by the petitioners would have been desirable. The law was
not clear, just as the facts evincing intent to form a trust were not clear. If a
trial occurred, the parties would have had the opportunity to argue about proper
jury instructions on the law. That would have set some precedent. Moreover,
the instruction may have been appealed, and the appellate courts may have
clarified the law respecting formations of trusts. Generally, settlement terms
are not illuminating to the law or to the public; if more cases are being settled,
there is the chance that laws will remain static instead of evolving with the
times. Of course, if Soko Bukai were to have lost in court, is that the precedent
the Japanese American community would have wanted? Obviously not, but the
community likely would have taken full advantage of the loss to generate publicity over the injustice. Thus, the Luban and Fiss positions force us to look at
this objectively, rather than through one party's eyes.
Alien land laws were important in Asian American history. Students,
scholars, and informed citizens need to learn about the laws of the past. A
written decision would allow those in the future to understand the complexity
and impact of laws several decades after their enactment - win or lose - that is
the public value. Similar or analogous cases could still be out there. If so, by
settling, the opportunity to have a binding precedent was lost. That leaves soci194

Fiss, supra note 182, at 1087.

David Luban, Settlement and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2626,
2639 (1995) (emphasis added).
'9'

Fall 2004]REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, SETTLEMENT, RECONCILIATION 203

ety with inconsistent and non-uniform settlement agreements until there is precedent. Actual adjudication could have affected how other groups dealt with
the resolution of property ownership affected by the alien land laws. The community did lose out on a chance for the justice system to admit and recognize
the harmful effects of the alien land laws and to acknowledge the injustice that
resulted. Quite probably, some members of the community would rather have
gone through the costly and drawn out litigation process to achieve that end.
At the very least, there was a missed opportunity for a trial on the social historical issues that would have benefited the public. Thus, Luban and Fiss would be
right to point out that some injustice occurred here.
While appealing, the missed-opportunity-for-precedent and attached-public-value-to-precedent themes represented by Fiss and Luban may be overstated
in their application here. According to the SF YWCA, the legal argument
presented by the petitioner has never been tested before in the courts, namely,
that an implied trust could be granted to an organization that did not enter into
an original trust agreement, but who represents similar interests as those who
did enter into the original trust agreement. Assuming that what the SF YWCA
claims is accurate, then such a fact pattern and legal argument will not likely
come up again soon. Arguably the facts were so personal and wedded to this
unique property that adjudication would not have established much precedent.
The public concern over the evilness of the alien land laws working in confluence with internment and how some individuals or entities took advantage of
Japanese Americans in that context were the big community issues. Those
were the facts and issues that riled up the community. But were those issues
going to be adjudicated in this case? Maybe not. Arguably, the Soko Bukai
case facts are relatively unique - more Japanese immigrants used their children
who were citizens to hold land; the trust notion was more anomalous.
Perhaps a written decision is not necessary if there are other avenues for
expressing public values and sources of information in the future. In other
words, public values statements may be achieved through other channels. Even
before the settlement, other avenues for expressions of public values occurred public demonstrations, local and state proclamations, and participation of local
leaders and public officials were all examples of meaningful statements of public values. Many of those outlets were manifestations of the rebellious style of
community lawyering and a fully engaged community.
Furthermore, Luban's argument that settlements produce no precedent to
follow only applies to settlements that remain private; here, the settlement
value did not stay private for long. The community's $733,000 contribution to
the settlement and the recovery of the building was announced, and the community rejoiced. In spite of the cash contribution, the community felt vindicated because the cash represented far less than the building's market value and
the side lot was part of the deal. Certainly, the dispute might have benefited
from a public trial, given the issues relating to internment and theft of property
from the initial Japanese buyers. Luban hints at a "public morality" that is
brought out by public discussion of disputes, and the community could have
benefited from making this public, as it might heal old wounds in the Japanese
American community over the injustice of internment and the financial
problems it caused. But reconciliation can come in other forms as well, and
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that was accomplished through settlement. Recovery of the building coupled
with continued commitment on the part of the Nihonmachi Little Friends to
engage in community education on the alien land laws and internment constitutes great public value that made settlement worthwhile. In the end, settlement
has precedential value in the same way that it has decisional value - in the
court of public opinion. And litigation and all of its corollary procedures was
only driving a deeper wedge between the parties.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow helps respond to the Fiss/Luban concerns by

warning us not to romanticize litigation:
[W]ith empirically unverified assumptions about what courts can or will do. More
important, those who privilege adjudication focus almost exclusively on structural
and institutional values and often give short shrift to those who are actually involved
in the litigation. I fear, but am not sure, that this debate can be reduced to those who
care more about the people actually engaged in disputes versus those who care more
arrangements. I prefer to think that we need
about the institutional and structural
196
both adjudication and settlement.

The questions that Menkel-Meadow poses that seem relevant to Soko
Bukai are as follows:
In a party-initiated legal system, when is it legitimate for the parties to settle their
dispute themselves, or with what assistance from a court in which they have sought
some legal-system support or service?
When is "consent" to a settlement legitimate and "real," and by what standards
should we (courts and academic critics) judge and permit such consent?
When, in a party-initiated legal system, should party consent be "trumped" by other
values - in other words, when should public, institutional, and structural needs and
values override parties' desire to settle or courts' incentives to promote settlement?
In short, when is the need for "public adjudication" or as Luban suggests, "public
settlement"
more important (to whom?) than what the parties may themselves
1 97
desire?
More often and more troubling to those who are concerned about justice, a litigated
outcome will produce binary win-lose results that often do not capture the "just reality." As John E. Coons argued so elegantly many years ago, compromise (or at least
nonbinary solutions) may represent more "precise justice" when we cannot be absolutely certain about the facts, or when competing principles of law dictate different
and sometimes opposed underlying values. Coons argued that courts (as well as settling parties) should be allowed to render fifty-fifty or other allocative verdicts when
either unresolved factual doubt or legal ambiguities or contradictions make winnertake-all results unjust. Thus, for me, until litigation is permitted to recognize the
ambiguities and contradictions in modem life by developing a broader "remedial
imagination," settlement offers the opportunity to craft solutions that do not compromise, but offer greater expression of the variety of remedial possibilities in a
postmodem world. 19 8

Luban and Fiss warn us about compromising without principle. That is a
very valid concern, especially in community law cases like Soko Bukai. However, principle seems to have been highly maintained here. As Menkel196 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophicaland Democratic
Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669 (1995).
197 Id. at 2670-71.
198 Id. at 2674-75.
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Meadow notes, litigation, rather than settlement, has led to the "monetization"
of legal disputes because money has become the proxy for all legal harms.' 99
She recognizes that settlement offers the opportunity to craft solutions that do
not compromise but offer greater expressions of the variety of remedial possibilities in a postmodem world. This is actually quite apparent in the Soko
Bukai case. While money played a huge role in the settlement, ultimately there
was creativity involved that would not have been possible in a courtroom trial.
The ultimate buyer, Nihonmachi Little Friends, was clearly not a party; however, Soko Bukai's concerns for community use were met because the buyer
turned out to be a community organization, benefiting the Japanese American
community and others. Additionally, while the price was an important aspect
of the settlement, the SF YWCA was quite willing to avoid the ordeal of a trial,
where negative publicity aimed at the organization was sure to be heightened win or lose.
Settlement enables parties, in Menkel-Meadow's view, to broaden the
scope of the debate. 200 Here, the issues were tried in the court of public opinion. Regardless of whether the trust was legally valid, the public felt strongly
that the SF YWCA was wrong in claiming the building and attempting to sell
it. In this sense, the public was able to enforce socially important values that
might not otherwise have been rewarded had this case been tried via legal channels. Instead of representing a compromise where values were set aside, settlement arguably represented "a moral commitment to equality, precision in
justice, accommodation, and peaceful coexistence of conflicting interests."2 0°
The SF YWCA was able to sell the property, obtain fair compensation, and
avoid further negative publicity. Soko Bukai and the community obtained the
property with a contribution at far below market value; the building was dedicated to community use; community members and the general public were educated on the injustices of the alien land laws and internment; and additional
years of legal wrangling were averted. In fact, the negotiation here yielded an
outcome that more closely resembled "justice." Both parties had legitimate
claims to the property and the SF YWCA had expended money on the property
over the years. From the Japanese American community's perspective, a sense
of reconciliation was achieved, at least with the larger community (although
certainly one could claim that many in the larger community already understood and supported the Japanese American community's claim to the building), and the SF YWCA was relieved of the burden of being portrayed as the
villain.
Additionally, settlement allowed the parties to reach a more creative outcome than a trial would have produced. A clear sense of justice was achieved
from the Japanese American community's perspective. While a legal victory
for Soko Bukai would have provided a great vindication of the discriminatory
practices epitomized by the alien land laws and internment, the settlement facilitated quite a similar platform from which to declare a principled victory over
the twin evils. In fact, if one sympathizes at all with the SF YWCA's position,
199 Id.
200 Id.
201

at 2672.

Id. at 2692.
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the settlement may have been more principled than a potential legal outcome
that gave the property outright to the community. Settlement allowed the parties to develop a broader range of possible solutions that responded to both the
community and the SF YWCA's needs. Bringing Nihonmachi Little Friends
and the SF YWCA's insurance company (if my speculation is accurate) into the
mix as part of the final settlement is the best example of the creative outcome
facilitated by the settlement. As such, the outcome provided a sense that justice
had been achieved.
The settlement process here was more suitable for what was essentially a
"multiparty" case that was clothed in a binary two-party litigation framework.2" 2 Although only two formal named parties were involved, the case was
truly complex and multiparty. The SF YWCA tenants, the original Japanese
immigrants who established the program, the older Japanese Americans who
were still alive and got deposed, the younger generations of Japanese Americans who would have benefited from the trust, and the Japanese American
church leaders all had interests and wished to chime in on the merits and goals
of the case. A collaborative approach to settlement invited participation from
these groups, and community-based counsel considered a variety of solutions
that went beyond the named parties. If the case went to trial, then counsel
would have concentrated only on marshalling the facts to prevail on the legal
issues. This would not necessarily have been synonymous with the broad
results recognized by the settlement. The "remedial imagination" of settlement
talks can allow for a more just outcome because it reflects the real world and
not the all-or-nothing approach of most courtroom situations. Soko Bukai and
its constituents - historical and modem-day - were a nebulous group, changing
over time and in composition. Perhaps settlement was also favorable because
petitioners were more of an interest-based group, rather than conventional
named plaintiffs. In this sense, settlement avoided having to put witnesses on
the stand (such as the elderly Japanese women) who might weaken the position
of Soko Bukai if they were ineffective. In settlement, they could remain more
of a body of interests who were represented by counsel.
Moreover, the results of a binary win-lose jurisprudence may have been
inappropriate in the Soko Bukai case. Compromise during settlement discussions is essential in cases where the facts are not certain, such as the legal
creation of a trust, breaches of trust, and payments toward purchases in the
context of decades-old laws and events with racial overtones. Settlement can
offer a more just outcome than a judgment because the courts would have difficulty offering an accurate reflection of liability or fault under those circumstances. This case is riddled with uncertainties, "legal ambiguities, and
"contradictions" where neither side could be definite about victory, and a "winner-take-all" result might be viewed as unjust.20 3 The law was unclear, witnesses were deceased or elderly, emotions ran high, community-based
organizations sat on both sides, and a long legal battle was on the horizon.
Settlement enabled the parties to forego the uncertainty of trial and devise a
solution of their own. The parties were fortunate that a creative solution was
202
203

Id. at 2692.
Id. at 2674.
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devised that incorporated community and non-community funds, enabling both
sides to walk away saving face.
Settlement was in the interest of the SF YWCA as well. A quick resolution was desirable because both organizations serve the community and rely on
public support. Dragging the dispute out could have seriously damaged both
parties' ability to serve their purpose. The historical context of the case played
an important role in spawning a desire for settlement on the SF YWCA's part.
If the case proceeded to litigation, public outcry against the SF YWCA would
have been rampant and extremely damaging. The historical discrimination
against Japanese Americans and their internment coupled with the politically
active communities of San Francisco would have created hostility not only
between the parties, but between other communities and the SF YWCA. Settlement allowed for the inclusion of non-legal solutions. From the SF YWCA's
perspective, clearing its name in the public's eye was important. Even if they
prevailed at trial, it is unlikely that this would have been accomplished; the SF
YWCA would still have lost in the public's eye. More bad publicity was likely.
Here, settlement provided the pressure for the SF YWCA to act morally - a
pressure that would not have had as much clout in a courtroom. Settlement
enabled the parties to go beyond the scope of litigation in several ways. While
the validity of the trust could have been litigated, it would have been much
more expensive and time consuming. The cost saved by settlement could have
been at least the same amount lost (or gained), depending upon the outcome of
the litigation. Therefore, it was mutually more beneficial, considering the
uncertainty of the outcome, to come to an agreement that was more acceptable
for both sides.
IX.

RECONCILIATION AND THE COMMON GOOD

I have been amazed at the establishment of programs such as the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which affords amnesty to
many who committed human rights violations under apartheid. Advocating
forgiveness in spite of the atrocities of the era is something to be marveled.
According to the Commission's website, the TRC was set up by the Government of National Unity to help deal with what happened under apartheid. The
conflict during this period resulted in violence and human rights abuses from
all sides. No section of society escaped these abuses." 2 " According to Dullah
Omar, former Minister of Justice, "a commission is a necessary exercise to
enable South Africans to come to terms with their past on a morally accepted
basis and to advance the cause of reconciliation. ' ' 205
The common-good values that flow from settlement that achieve a sense
of reconciliation are absent from the positions that Fiss and Luban take in
opposition to settlement. Fiss' criticism of settlement and Luban's respect for
the precedential value of definitive rulings are based on critical tenets of American jurisprudence. But settlement helps to support and maintain another fundamental goal of the legal system and society at large - helping to construct the
204 See South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/
(last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
205 Id.
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common good. In order to accomplish that fundamental goal, give-and-take is
necessary in part to achieve justice, but also as an expression of good faith.
Certainly, advocating capitulation at the expense of exploitation is not the purpose here, but promoting agreement for the sake of peace and mutual respect in
order to accomplish a larger purpose is worthy of support.
Settlement in the Soko Bukai case, and the attorneys' active promotion of
settlement under the circumstances, is consistent with principles of lawyering
that should be given recognition. Formal professional responsibility provisions
provide support for the general notion that lawyers ought to work for the betterment of society. This notion is not limited to civic activities, political functions, or general volunteer work but also applies to daily client counseling.
Professional responsibility rules generally mandate deference to a client's
wishes as long as they are within the bounds of the law. Therefore, problems
may arise when trying to encourage a client to pursue strategies other than the
most vigorous ones preferred by the client. For example, Ethical Canon (EC)
7-1 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that the "duty of
a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law."2 6 The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility tells us that when choices affect the merits of a client's case or
substantially prejudice a client's rights, "the authority to make decisions is
exclusively that of the client and . . . such decisions are binding on his
lawyer. '"207

But a variety of ethical provisions lend support to the lawyer who encourages a client to pursue a strategy that is less likely to damage community relations - even if that strategy will not yield the greatest pecuniary result or
swiftest relief for the client. As early as 1908, the Canons of Professional Ethics declared that the lawyer "advances the honor of his profession and the best
interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to
impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles of moral law."2 °8 The preamble to the current Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a
vital role in the preservation of society .... Within the framework of [funda-

mental ethical] principles, a lawyer must with courage and foresight be able
and ready to shape the body of the law to the ever-changing relationships of
society.

' '

Existing provisions support not only an ethical duty for lawyers to consider the interests of society as a whole, but also a lawyer's responsibility to
exercise independent judgment and counsel clients on the extralegal issues
presented by a case. Model Rule 2.1 provides that "in representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid
advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be
206 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
207

EC 7-1 (1980) (footnotes omitted).

id. at EC 7-7.

208 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
209 MODEL CODE,

supra

Canon 32 (1908).

note 204, at Preamble.
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relevant to the client's situation.

21 °

Similarly, the ABA Model Code EC 7-8

states that:
[A]dvice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal considerations
.... In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer
to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as
consequences that
legally permissible. He may emphasize the possibility of harsh
2 11
might result from assertion of legally permissible positions.

The work of the Soko Bukai attorneys and the $733,000 contribution on
the part of Nihonmachi Little Friends toward the ultimate settlement of the
dispute epitomize the spirit of working for the common good in the resolution
of legal disputes. The Japanese American community took the high road in this
case, and society as a whole benefited from a settlement rather than suffering
through a full fledged litigation battle that could have gone on for many more
years. The community simply wanted to continue using the building for community purposes, consistent with its original founding. Even though the community was in a position to further leverage its sympathetic position at the
expense of the SF YWCA's image, the community had a fair goal in mind and
was able to reach it without insisting on more. The building and the side lot
were obtained without a trial for a price the community was willing to pay.
The community was able to air its grievances and educate the public during the
course of the litigation, end up with the property for community use, and center
a community education program in the building permanently. In that way, the
community was able to achieve a sense of reconciliation with the larger community over the extensive historical oppression that it had suffered from the
twin evils of the alien land laws and internment, not to mention general racism.
The community was willing to come up with money as a sign of good faith, for
the sake of peace, to obtain a sense of reconciliation, and for the common good.
Although the SF YWCA may not have had the same sense of reconciliation (note the bitter tone of the letter to the editor issued by the SF YWCA's
executive director),2 12 the agency received a good deal of money in the end,
and its public relations nightmare was brought to a close. Part of the problem
210 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1993) (emphasis added). The com-

ment to Rule 2.1 points out that legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives
that a client may be disinclined to confront.
Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially
where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant.
Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a
lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a
lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most
legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.
A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When
such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at
face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however,
the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than
strictly legal considerations. Id. at cmt.
211 MODEL CODE, supra note 204, at EC 7-8 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Note
the use of similar language in EC 7-10: "The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with
zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons
involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm." Id. at EC 7-10.
212 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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for the SF YWCA was that, whether or not it bore some culpability for the
community's past suffering, it became the emblem for the alien land laws and
internment. As such, it was de facto placed in the unenviable position of
defending the nation's racist past, thereby exposing itself to being labeled
racist. No institution - especially a community-based one - appreciates that
label. Irrespective of what one may think about the hard ball litigation strategies of its counsel or its disrespectful and ill-stated public relations actions, 2the
13
SF YWCA (historically or modern-day) likely was not consciously racist.
Yet, during the dispute, its representatives were portrayed that way because
they were put in a position of representing old racist laws. But given the tension that flowed from the dispute, a peaceful resolution was important for the
common good.
The Fissian concern for justice rather than simply peace and Luban's
regard for the precedential public value of definitive rulings may very well
subordinate the sense of reconciliation that a group like the Japanese American
community here may have experienced. Fiss and Luban may also brush aside
the fact that client satisfaction is commonly achieved through the ADR process.
Parties often experience a sense of empowerment within the ADR context,
which carries over into other arenas, as individuals are able to gain more control over their lives.21 4 In this case, the lawsuit was significant to countless
members of the Japanese American community. Non-party individuals and
groups were invested in an attempt to seek redress for the injuries suffered by
the community as a result of the historical racist laws enacted against their
parents and grandparents. Thus, the lawsuit became a vehicle to revisit issues
like the alien land laws, helping to generate a dialogue that extended beyond
the Japanese American community. The process and the ability to engage in
that effort provided great satisfaction to the community; the scope of activity
around the issues was extremely significant.
Given the fact that this case was complicated, involving a petitioner who
represented a community of individuals and entities of the past and the present,
decades-old evidence and controversial historical actions, and a respondent that
was also a community group with an arguably sympathetic position, a process
to resolve the dispute that ultimately gave control to the parties made sense.
One of the advantages of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes is that
the parties are provided with greater control of the process.2 15 This is important to a modem legal system, because "the spectrum of disputes in modem
21 6
society demands a corresponding spectrum of resolutions methodologies.
In the Soko Bukai case, temporal factors were highly relevant to seeking a fair
Certainly, institutions or individuals who rely on institutions, laws, and values that were
constructed in a racist environment should, however, be aware of their own unconscious
racism. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
214 See Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, TransformativeMediation in the USPS Redress
(TM) Program: Observations of ADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399, 402
(2001).
215 Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Alternative DisputeResolution in the Twenty-First Century: Across
the Ripple of Time: The Future of Alternative (or is it "Appropriate")Dispute Resolution,
36 TULSA L.J. 785.
213
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resolution. Viewing the disposition of the case with an eye toward the contours
of time, place, and manner, we realize that resolution of a case that literally
took ninety years to evolve, relating to individuals who have appeared and
passed on and transforming social values, is probably least appropriate for a
conventional win-lose courtroom setting. Thus, ADR is probably the -most
appropriate setting for the lawyer as healer whose major goal may be to bring
peace to the lives of her clients. 2 17 Certainly, an approach to lawyering that
seeks "reconciliation, forgiveness, and healing" between the parties is a worthy
purpose.2 18 But in Soko Bukai, the healing and reconciliation for the Japanese
American community was very much about its self-healing and reconciliation
with the culpable institutions (social and public, private and governmental) of
the past. The settlement process facilitated this deliberative healing and reconciliation by allowing the community lawyers, Soko Bukai members and leaders, and Nihonmachi Little Friends officials to help decide what would be best
for the community. While the case was certainly about trying to gain possession of the building and conducting public education about the alien land laws,
it was also very much about reconciliation with the past.
X.

CONCLUSION

When is a building something more than just a building? A visitor walking by the 1830 Sutter Street building on a typical San Francisco weekday
afternoon likely would hear and see children playing in the playground. The
vistor might even look up and appreciate some features of the Julia Morgan
style structure. The building's Japanese architectural design and the corners of
the roof might deserve a second look; but to the untrained, the building might
evoke nothing particularly special. We all know that a house is not necessarily
a home. Something special must happen to make it a home, generally involving friends or family. Similarly, a building is just a building unless something
special has occurred. In the 1920s, something special did take place at 1830
Sutter Street that transformed the building into a home for the community. The
Issei women that opened its portals to their children, to others in the community, and to generations of other community residents who followed were unaware of the magic they had performed. Decades later, the building was not
only a community center, but it had also become the symbol for the homes, the
businesses, the real and personal property of Japanese Americans subjected to
the confluence of the twin evils of alien land laws and internment.
The Soko Bukai legal team and the community pulled off a little magic of
their own some eighty years later, reclaiming the historic 1830 Sutter community building and clearing any cloud to ownership. Yes, it took cash, but at far
below market value. The rebellious strategies devised and implemented by
lawyers, residents, and allies working in concert involved more than seeking
victory on a legal issue. Taking the opportunity to educate the community and
the public on the historical background to the building and the community was
every bit a part of the social-legal strategy. In the end, through settlement,
217 Id.; see also Edward D. Shapiro, The Practice of Holistic Lawyering, 16 CBA REcoRD

38 (Feb./Mar. 2002).

218 Shapiro, supra note 217.
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extra-legal remedies became available, and a true sense of justice and reconciliation with the broader community was achieved. The Japanese American community demonstrated dignity and class, allowing the SF YWCA to walk away
with a face-saving outcome, while attaining peace for the common good.

